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DRAWING TRUMP NAKED: CURBING THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY TO PROTECT PUBLIC DISCOURSE
THOMAS E. KADRI *
From Donald Trump to Lindsay Lohan to Manuel Noriega, real
people who are portrayed in expressive works are increasingly targeting creators of those works for allegedly violating their “right
of publicity”—a state-law tort that prohibits the unauthorized use
of a person’s name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics.
Intuitively, we might feel confident that Mark Zuckerberg should
not be able to block his portrayal in The Social Network movie,
that Marilyn Monroe could not have stopped Andy Warhol from
exhibiting his vibrant paintings, that O.J. Simpson could not have
demanded money from FX to air the American Crime Story docudrama. But what supports these intuitions? And should we be so
confident?
This Article provides a new framework to reconcile publicity
rights with a robust commitment to free speech under the First
Amendment. After describing the current landscape in the courts,
this Article scrutinizes the “educative” First Amendment theory
that has motivated many of the past decisions confronting the right
of publicity—a listener-focused theory that relies on the public’s
right to receive information. This Article then reframes the doctrine in a new way: as four distinct educative defenses that have
developed to assuage concerns about publicity rights interfering
with speech on matters of public concern. These four defenses
might seem encouraging to those who worry that publicity rights
impair expressive rights. But all too often they have instead complicated and undermined the opposition to publicity rights and, as
a result, they pose an unexpected and underestimated threat to free
speech. To combat this threat, this Article recalibrates First
Amendment theory as it relates to the right of publicity.
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To adequately protect creators and their expressive works, this
Article argues that we must abandon educative models of the First
Amendment and instead adopt an approach that also protects the
speaker as a central part of enabling public discourse. Failure to
adopt this speaker-focused theory in publicity doctrine will perpetuate confusion in the courts and state legislatures, an outcome that
will have a chilling effect on creators who seek to portray real people in their work. Yet we must also recognize the interests that
publicity rights can serve. As we move into an era of new technology and innovation—from “deep fakes” to nonconsensual pornography—this challenge will only intensify. To address it, courts
should refer to the constitutional concept of “public discourse”
when publicity rights face off against expressive rights—a concept
that not only empowers free expression, but also considers the narrow interests that we should all have in preventing certain uses of
our images.
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INTRODUCTION
In the months before the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump had
more than polling numbers on his mind. While Trump wooed crowds with
his promise to restore national greatness, painter Illma Gore depicted the future president in a nude and unflattering portrait aptly titled Make America
Great Again. 1 Her goal was to highlight “the significance we place on our

1. Claire Voon, The Donald Threatens to Sue Artist over Her Trump Micropenis Portrait,
HYPERALLERGIC (Apr. 20, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/292436/the-donald-threatens-to-sueartist-over-her-trump-micropenis-portrait/.
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physical selves” and challenge the idea that appearance defines “your ability,
your power, or your status.” 2 But when images of the portrait went viral,
Trump’s legal team threatened to sue Gore for painting him without his permission. 3
Trump’s dispute with Gore is part of a growing trend. In recent years,
creators of expressive works 4 have faced legal challenges brought by a bizarre cast of characters, including Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega,5
Mexican drug lord “El Chapo” Guzmán, 6 wayward actress Lindsey Lohan, 7
and Hollywood dame Olivia de Havilland. 8 What have these creators done
to provoke litigation? They portrayed real people. After releasing documentaries, songs, paintings, films, or videogames, they were accused of violating
someone’s “right of publicity”—a state-law tort that prohibits the unauthorized use of a person’s name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics.9
2. Interview with Illma Gore, Artist & Creator, Making America Great Again, in New Haven,
Conn. (Feb. 19, 2018).
3. Voon, supra note 1; see Patrick Greenfield, Artist Threatened with Lawsuits If She Sells
Nude Donald Trump Painting, GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/apr/17/nude-donald-trump-painting-illma-gore-lawsuits.
4. I use the term “creators” here because, for my purposes, it comes closest to capturing the
diverse set of actors involved in producing and distributing expressive works—from movie-makers
to singers to documentarians to journalists to YouTubers. Defining what constitutes an “expressive
work” is, at times, a vexing task. It is ultimately a construct shaped by social practice, and any
definition must capture any medium of expression that we commonly use to communicate ideas and
opinions. When I use the term “expressive works,” I mean to capture not only the more traditional
forms of news and entertainment media—such as paintings, books, newspapers, movies, documentaries, music, and photography—but also those media of a more recent vintage—such as videogames, memes, and Tweets—that now serve as vehicles for so much of our public discourse. See
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (discussing First Amendment protection
of some expressive works); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 169 (1995).
5. Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (suing the makers of the Call of Duty videogame for portraying him “as an antagonist and as the culprit of numerous fictional heinous crimes”).
6. Dolia Estevez, Do Univision and Netflix Have to Pay Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán to
Air His Life Story?, FORBES (June 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2016/06/01/do-univision-and-netflix-have-to-pay-drug-lord-el-chapo-guzman-to-air-his-lifestory/#af177385f224 (reporting on Guzmán’s plan to sue the makers of a television series because
they recounted his life story and used his nickname without his permission and without compensating him).
7. Litigious Lohan tried and failed twice. See Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.,
97 N.E.3d 389, 392 (N.Y. 2018) (suing the creators of the Grand Theft Auto V videogame because
it featured a “blonde woman . . . wearing a red bikini and bracelets, taking a ‘selfie’ with her cell
phone, and displaying the peace sign with one of her hands”); Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447,
451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (suing the rapper Pitbull after he sang that he was “tiptoein’, to keep
flowin’ . . . got it locked up like Lindsay Lohan”).
8. De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 630–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
(suing the producers of the docudrama Feud for portraying 101-year-old actress Olivia de Havilland).
9. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.050 (West 2017) (representing an archetypal
publicity statute).
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Concern about the right of publicity has not been driven merely by an
uptick in litigation. In response to new technologies, scholars have renewed
their interest in this area 10 and state legislatures across the country have been
debating laws that could alter existing protections for expressive works. 11
Courts, too, have seen a slew of high-profile cases that pit publicity rights
against expressive rights in ways that have been complicated by emerging
technologies. 12 Some commentators have encouraged steps to prevent the
“extravagant” 13 right of publicity from being a “bloated monster” that imperils free speech, 14 while others have argued for broader publicity rights that
would place greater limits on portrayals of real people. 15 Either future could
come to pass: absent meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court, 16 lower
courts have been experimenting with a variety of confusing and contradictory
tests to reconcile these competing visions. 17 The circuit split is deepening, 18
the petitions for certiorari are piling up, 19 and federal courts are even asking

10. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD 1 (2018); Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through the Right of Publicity,
LAWFARE (Mar. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/combatting-deep-fakesthrough-right-publicity; see also Stacey Dogan, Stirring the Pot: A Response to Rothman’s Right of
Publicity, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 321 (2019); Mark A. Lemley, Privacy, Property, and Publicity,
117 MICH. L. REV. 1153 (2019).
11. See Jacob Gershman, Critics Pounce on Proposed PRINCE Act in Minnesota, WALL ST.
J.: L. BLOG (May 16, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/05/16/critics-pounce-on-proposed-prince-act-in-minnesota/; Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Right of Publicity Bill Resurrected
Again, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 6, 2018, 12:45 PM),
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-right-publicity-bill-resurrected-again.
12. See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1270–84 (9th Cir. 2013).
13. Dogan, supra note 10, at 329.
14. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 7. For additional critiques dating back over twenty years, see
Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech
Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 488–98 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put
the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL J. ART., TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 35 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Update on N.Y. Right of Publicity, SAG-AFTRA (June 23, 2017),
https://www.sagaftra.org/update-ny-right-publicity (supporting the creation of post-mortem publicity rights).
16. The Supreme Court’s only dalliance with the right of publicity came forty years ago in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), where the Court allowed a
publicity claim to proceed over a First Amendment defense without giving much guidance on how
future courts should reconcile similar cases. Id. at 574–75.
17. Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1177–81 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1448 (2016) (cataloguing the tests adopted by state and federal courts around the country); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 14–21, Elec. Arts Inc. v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016) (No. 15-424) (same).
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).

2019]

DRAWING TRUMP NAKED

903

their state counterparts for help with particularly difficult questions. 20 It
seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court addresses the right
of publicity for the first time in over forty years. 21
In the meantime, this lingering uncertainty is problematic for free
speech: creators of expressive works do not know where they stand, and the
stakes are too high to take a risk because violating publicity rights has serious
consequences. Not only do some states criminalize the underlying conduct, 22
but plaintiffs may seek potent forms of relief to remedy violations, including
nationwide injunctions 23 and damages for emotional distress and commercial
injuries. 24 Even when creators of expressive works have prevailed in court,
they have often had to wage costly wars to win, sometimes after years of
litigation and multiple appeals.25 And due to state-by-state variations in the
right of publicity and the defenses to it, the strength of expressive rights shifts
across state lines. This patchwork protection creates a chilling effect.26 Stuck
in legal limbo, creators of expressive works may make their portrayals less

20. Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2018), certified question accepted, 94 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. 2018) (asking the Indiana Supreme Court whether online fantasy-sports
games may use Indiana’s “newsworthy” and “public interest” exceptions to the right of publicity to
block a lawsuit brought by former college athletes whose names, pictures, and on-field statistics
were used without permission).
21. The United States Supreme Court last addressed the right of publicity in 1977. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2019).
23. Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property
Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1950 (2015); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2115–16 (2017).
24. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 11:30–11:35 (2d ed.
2017).
25. Consider, for example, the publicity claim brought against the makers of the movie The
Hurt Locker. The claim was filed in a New Jersey district court in 2010, transferred to California
district court in 2011, appealed and argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 2013, and finally decided on appeal in 2016—nearly six years after the movie won the
Oscar for Best Picture. See Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 891–96 (9th Cir. 2016).
26. See Dogan, supra note 10, at 327 (arguing that “the lack of a coherent normative rudder
for the right of publicity has led courts to balance publicity and speech interests in an ad hoc manner
that favors traditional forms of expression, penalizes uses that courts view as exploitative, and inevitably chills speech”).
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realistic or refrain from including real people altogether. 27 At the very least,
anyone depicting a real person must tread carefully. 28
Against this backdrop, there have been diverse proposals to reconcile
the First Amendment with an individual’s right to prevent others from portraying her. Some scholars have focused on the theoretical justifications for
the tort. 29 They have questioned, for example, whether publicity rights actually create incentives for people to invest in their personae 30 and whether we
even want to create these incentives in the first place. 31 Other scholars have
criticized the court-created tests that purport to address competing First
Amendment interests, often proposing new frameworks that they believe
would strike a better balance. 32 But absent from this conversation has been
a thorough analysis of an important objection to publicity rights: restricting

27. See Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0
Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (2014). The chaotic state of publicity law brings to mind Professor Lon Fuller’s list of formal criteria that law must meet. Fuller
catalogued various violations of his principles of legality, including “[1] a failure to publicize, or at
least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; . . . [2] a failure to
make rules understandable; [3] the enactment of contradictory rules; [and] . . . [4] introducing such
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them.” LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969). For Fuller, “[a] total failure in any one of these [four]
directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly
called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can
still be said to be one kind of contract.” Id. at 40. Although a law like the right of publicity cannot
hope to establish perfect ex-ante notice of liability, the current doctrinal disarray might have tempted
Fuller to declare many of his principles violated. Cf. Dogan, supra note 10, at 329 (remarking that
the right of publicity “is excessive and unpredictable, it lacks an adequate normative rationale, and
it poses unjustifiable costs on speech and other interests”).
28. See Stacey Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Publicity as a Legal
Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 17, 20 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds., 2014) (“[W]hile courts often rule in favor of the
defendant on First Amendment grounds, they do so by applying murky legal standards that offer
little certainty or comfort to parties thinking about selling a product that draws upon a celebrity
identity.”).
29. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 178–238 (1993); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the
Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 245 n.218 (2002).
30. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 100; Lemley, supra note 10, at 1157; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–
48 (2004).
31. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 101; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187–88 (2006) (“Even if celebrities [could be incentivized to invest in personae], it is not at all clear that society should want
to encourage fame for fame’s sake.”); Madow, supra note 29, at 215–19.
32. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 138–59; Kadri, supra note 27, at 1525–31; see also
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 31, at 1217–20; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs.
The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994); Jennifer
E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L. J. 185, 223 (2012); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 913–30 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam,
You Made the Pants Too Long, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 286 (2000).
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portrayals of real people inhibits speech on matters of public concern. 33 This
Article fills that void.
In bridging this gap, this Article reviews how courts are actually responding to this objection. It then reframes the doctrine as four distinct defenses that have developed to assuage concerns about publicity rights interfering with speech on matters of public concern: (1) a constitutional
affirmative defense to shield expressive works relating to matters of public
concern; (2) a constitutional requirement that public-figure plaintiffs prove
“actual malice” in order to prevail on their publicity claims; (3) state-law exceptions to the right of publicity for portrayals that are “newsworthy” or in
the “public interest”; and (4) a method of constitutional avoidance in which
courts narrowly construe publicity tort elements to evade certain free-speech
concerns. These four defenses might initially seem encouraging to those who
worry that publicity rights impair expressive rights. But all too often they
have instead complicated and undermined the opposition to publicity rights
and, as a result, they pose an unexpected and underestimated threat to free
speech. 34 This is because many courts have adopted what I call an “educative” free-speech theory to explain these defenses. This theory focuses only
on the listener’s interests in receiving information—not the speaker’s interests in speaking—and conditions protection for expressive works on their
ability to “communicat[e] information to voters.” 35 As a result, educative
theory offers only parasitic protection: expressive works are protected only
to the extent that they convey accurate information that facilitates democratic
deliberation. 36
This Article argues that a different free-speech theory should animate
the analysis—a theory that recognizes that an essential objective of the First
Amendment should be to protect a speaker’s right to participate in public

33. Nearly forty years ago, Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin touched on this issue when
discussing certain problems that publicity rights pose given that “the news and entertainment media
frequently portray real people without authorization.” Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (1979).
But much has changed in the last four decades, and Felcher and Rubin’s work, while still relevant
and influential, is ripe for reassessment.
34. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (denying First Amendment
protection to play featuring performers who imitated the style and appearance of the Marx Brothers
because the play was neither “biographical” nor “an attempt to convey information about the Marx
Brothers themselves or about the development of their characters”).
35. See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, The Right to Be
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1009 n.112 (2018) (citing
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1965)).
36. For prominent examples of educative theory, see OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35
(1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
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discourse. This right to participate in public discourse includes the right to
create expressive works, even when those works feature real people, and the
use of a person’s name or likeness in public discourse should rarely provide
a basis for liability. In critiquing educative defenses against the right of publicity, this Article provides a theory to limit publicity rights that has been
lacking in other scholarship—a theory that considers not only the interests
underlying the tort, but also the First Amendment interests in portraying real
people.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the tension between publicity rights and free speech. Part II explores the four defenses
raised when publicity rights interfere with speech on matters of public concern, critiquing the educative theory that courts have adopted to limit protection for expressive works under these defenses. Part III explains how the
constitutional concept of public discourse offers a superior way to comprehend the limits of publicity rights when real people are portrayed in expressive works. Finally, Part III also discusses how courts might address some
of today’s toughest questions in this area, including issues raised by new
technologies such as “deep fake” videos, nonconsensual pornography, and
realistic videogames.
I. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
The right of publicity may scarcely appear on a first-year Torts syllabus,
but it is a legal claim of growing importance. 37 A creature of both statute and
common law, the tort’s scope varies somewhat from state to state.38 It generally encompasses the right to prevent the unauthorized use of peoples’
names and likenesses, though some jurisdictions even recognize a right to
prohibit others from merely “evoking” a person in the minds of viewers or
listeners. 39
Courts and scholars have suggested a slew of justifications for publicity
rights. 40 Some focus on benefits to the public, such as the idea that publicity

37. See supra notes 5–8, 10–15.
38. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, at § 6:2.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM LAW INST. 1995) (“One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability . . . .”); Lemley,
supra note 10, at 1169 (“[T]he situation is so bad that the actual elements of the right of publicity
cause of action in California are (1) use of something that reminds someone of a person (2) for
economic advantage.”).
40. See generally C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089–90 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007);
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 98–112 (analyzing the various purported interests).
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rights efficiently maximize wealth and allocate resources, 41 or that they create incentives for people to act in ways that ultimately advance public welfare. 42 Other justifications claim to serve individual interests by, for example, rewarding labor and preventing unjust enrichment caused by
freeloading 43 or addressing dignitary injuries that unauthorized portrayals inflict on a person’s autonomy, liberty, and privacy. 44 And some justifications
seek to vindicate both public and individual concerns, like the notion that
publicity rights provide a remedy for false product endorsements that deceive
consumers and inflict dignitary injuries on the person falsely associated with
the product. 45 Many of these purported justifications have been undermined
or debunked—a matter we will return to later. For now, it suffices to say
that, although there may be sound reasons to doubt the wisdom of recognizing a right of publicity at all, 46 that ship has likely sailed. At least thirty-three
states now recognize some form of the tort, and that number seems more
likely to grow than shrink. 47
A. The Right of Publicity’s Commercial Core
To understand the tension between publicity rights and free speech, it is
important to recognize the tort’s commercial core. 48 A typical use of the right
of publicity is to challenge the unauthorized use of a person’s name or image
in association with a commercial advertisement or product. If, for example,
a supermarket promotes itself in a magazine by sticking its logo next to Michael Jordan’s name and a pair of basketball shoes bearing his famed number
“23,” Jordan might have a viable claim that the supermarket violated his right
of publicity. 49 The combination of the commercial advertisement and the
unauthorized use of his name and legendary apparel would likely satisfy the
41. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38, 438 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
210–53 (2003); Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 97, 103–04, 126 (1994); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 412–
13 (1978).
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
43. ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10 (summarizing and critiquing this justification).
44. See, e.g., id. at 111–12; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational
Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 158–59 (2001); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005).
45. See generally Lemley, supra note 10, at 1163–64; McKenna, supra note 44.
46. Madow, supra note 29, at 178–238; see also Rothman, supra note 29, at 245 n.218.
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, at § 6:2; The Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law (last visited May 2, 2019).
48. By using this term, I mean not to imply that publicity rights originally or exclusively protected commercial interests. As Rothman has shown, the right of publicity has long been concerned
with privacy harms that need not be economic. See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 1–64.
49. This hypothetical isn’t all that hypothetical. Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d
509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014) (reviving Jordan’s challenge to a supermarket’s “A Shoe In!” ad).
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tort’s elements in most jurisdictions. 50 It is important to note, however, that
publicity rights need not depend on misleading implications of endorsement.
Suppose that a supermarket frequented by fans of a rival team published an
advertisement saying: “MJ may be a six-time NBA champion and the star of
Space Jam, but he’s never graced our grocery store!” Jordan’s claim would
not sound in a theory of endorsement, but he could still challenge the commercial appropriation of his name and likeness. 51
At the very least, then, publicity rights have been understood as a form
of “property protection” that allows people to “profit from the full commercial value of their identities” and challenge the “false and misleading impression” of association with a commercial product or service. 52 This commercial core has important constitutional implications because it means that
many publicity claims challenge uses in “commercial” speech, 53 which has a
“special meaning” in the First Amendment context. 54 Although the line between commercial and noncommercial speech can be elusive, the clearest
example is speech that is “related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience” 55 and “does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’” 56 Even if an advertisement contains speech about important
public issues, it may nonetheless constitute commercial speech if it promotes
a product and is economically motivated. 57

50. These elements vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the Restatement (Second)
of Torts provides a representative model: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Jordan’s lawyers would surely have endorsed
the accompanying comment, which states that the “common form” of this tort “is the appropriation
and use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for
some similar commercial purpose.” Id. § 652C cmt.
51. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967–68 (10th
Cir. 1996) (formulating a similar hypothetical based on Madonna’s distaste for bananas). In my
view, there might be constitutional and policy grounds to question a broad publicity-based protection for mere associations.
52. See id. at 968; Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001).
53. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving a
claim by a Major League Baseball player against a publishing company for using his likeness to its
commercial advantage).
54. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001).
55. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
56. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Va. State Pharmacy
Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). Following Bolger, lower
courts have distilled three factors relevant to deciding if speech is commercial. See, e.g., Dryer v.
Nat’l Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2016) (considering “(i) whether the communication is an advertisement, (ii) whether it refers to a specific product or service, and (iii) whether
the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech” (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,
173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 970 (“[C]ommercial
speech is best understood as speech that merely advertises a product or service for business purposes.”).
57. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–68.
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The right of publicity’s commercial core is important for two reasons.
First, as the doctrine currently stands, false or deceptive commercial speech
enjoys no First Amendment protection. 58 This rule liberates many publicity
claims from constitutional scrutiny entirely, for the First Amendment offers
no shield against liability for misleading commercial associations, like the
ones in our Michael Jordan examples. 59 Second, even if speech is not false
or misleading, by merely being commercial it is entitled to lesser First
Amendment protection than noncommercial speech. 60 Because of this limited constitutional protection, states have greater leeway to regulate commercial speech. 61 The result is that many publicity claims will win out over any
asserted right to portray real people in commercial speech. 62
B. Expressive Works and the Right of Publicity
If the core of the right of publicity is commercial, what does the right of
publicity have to do with expressive works? One answer might be “nothing
at all.” The author of the leading treatise on the right of publicity, Professor
J. Thomas McCarthy, has made such a claim: “[T]he only kind of speech
impacted by the right of publicity is commercial speech—advertising. Not
news, not stories, not entertainment and not entertainment satire and parody—only advertising and similar commercial uses.” 63 Even Professor Michael Madow, who fretted over the burgeoning right of publicity, confidently
declared that “personas may be freely appropriated for . . . ‘entertainment’
purposes . . . [and] permission need not be obtained, nor payment made, for
use of a celebrity’s name or likeness in a news report, novel, play, film, or

58. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563–64.
59. See id.; Rothman, supra note 23, at 1955–56.
60. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).
61. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562.
62. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001). But
see supra note 51. The right of publicity’s commercial core might be important for a third reason.
Although this is somewhat conjectural, it might explain why so much publicity doctrine has adopted
the listener-focused theory of free speech discussed in this Article. As a constitutional category,
commercial speech is subjected to greater regulation in part because courts have adopted a listenerfocused theory in shaping the doctrine. The constitutional analysis is built around consumers’ interests in receiving accurate information about commercial products. The commercial speaker,
then, gains constitutional protection primarily as a means to ensure that the listener receives nonmisleading information. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1979) (upholding a state law
prohibiting optometrists’ use of trade names because “[a] trade name conveys no information about
the price and nature of the services”); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech,
and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 775–76 (1999) (“Conventional First Amendment doctrine holds that the Constitution protects commercial speech only to
enable listeners to receive valuable ‘information’ about the market.”).
63. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The Human Persona
As Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 131 (1995);
see also J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right
of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 198 (2001).
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biography.” 64 But as Professor Jennifer Rothman has persuasively shown,
“[t]he facts on the ground . . . challenge this vision of a limited right.” 65
Rothman’s “facts on the ground” are shown in case after case, where
courts have not dispatched with publicity claims through a commercialspeech-only rule but instead grappled with whether publicity rights may prevent or punish portrayals of real people in expressive works. 66 Lawsuits have
been brought against filmmakers, by the former manager of rap group
N.W.A.; 67 against actors, by the banker who inspired the toupee-wearing
crook in The Wolf of Wall Street; 68 against TV-show producers, by a New
Yorker convicted of murdering his parents; 69 against podcasters, by the estate
of the protagonist from the hit series S-Town; 70 against videogame creators,
by the heirs of long-deceased war hero, Lieutenant General George Patton; 71
and even against documentarians, by the record holder in the Donkey Kong
arcade game. 72
For free-speech enthusiasts, it might be surprising that the viability of
these claims is even debatable. The First Amendment generally provides robust protection for expressive works as a speech medium, 73 even when the

64. Madow, supra note 29, at 130.
65. Rothman, supra note 23, at 1951–59. It is important to note that, although most states
require the unauthorized use to be for “a commercial purpose,” sometimes “any purpose or advantage” will suffice. See id. at 1950.
66. E.g., Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2016); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir.
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2013); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–76 (10th Cir. 1996). Although
these claims seem to be cropping up with increasing regularity, they are by no means new. See,
e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93–94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that a plaintiff truthfully
identified as a prostitute in a movie was entitled to block the showing of the movie).
67. See Heller v. NBCUniversal, Inc., No. CV-15-09631-MWF-KS, 2016 WL 6573985, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2016) (suit arising from the biographical film Straight Outta Compton).
68. Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 138 F. Supp. 3d 226, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (suit arising from the movie The Wolf of Wall Street).
69. Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y. S.3d 769, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (suit
arising from the made-for-TV biopic Romeo Killer: The Christopher Porco Story). In another recent case, the makers of a TV miniseries have faced publicity claims brought by the Fox News
staffer whose sexual-harassment allegations against former Fox News chief Roger Ailes led to his
ouster. See Complaint, Luhn v. Scott, No. 1:19-cv-01180 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2019).
70. Matt Stevens, ‘S-Town’s’ Treatment of Its Main Character Was Riveting. But Was It Unlawful?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/arts/s-town-podcastlawsuit-john-b-mclemore.html (reporting on suit arising from the podcast S-Town).
71. Complaint, CMG Worldwide Inc. v. Slitherine Ltd., No. 3:14-cv-05124 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
19, 2014) (suit arising from the videogame History Legends of War: Patton).
72. Mitchell v. Cartoon Network, Inc., Civ. No. 15-5668, 2015 WL 12839135, at *1 (D.N.J.
Nov. 20, 2015) (suit arising from the documentary The King of Kong: A Fistful of Quarters).
73. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973) (“[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings,
and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection . . . .”).
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works are sold commercially. 74 Expressive works do not suddenly become
commercial speech because they are sold for profit. 75 As one court has
quipped, creators “need not give away [their works] in order to bring them
within the ambit of the First Amendment.” 76 What’s more, the First Amendment disfavors content-based speech restrictions, and publicity claims that
challenge portrayals of real people in expressive works “target speech based
on its communicative content.” 77 It is no response to say that publicity claims
involve disputes between private parties; civil liability for speech acts must
still comport with the Constitution, even if the issue arises in a private tort
suit. 78 As the Supreme Court made clear long ago in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 79 torts like the right of publicity are “mere labels” of state law that
“can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and instead “must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” 80
All of this might suggest that the resolution in these cases is actually
quite simple. The dispositive inquiry is whether the speech is commercial or
noncommercial; and if it is noncommercial, it is protected. But, of course,
such a straightforward resolution has not emerged from the courts. Instead,
as Part II illustrates, courts have struggled to agree on how to square publicity
rights with free-speech rights when real people are portrayed in expressive
works.
II. WHAT’S THE MATTER (OF PUBLIC CONCERN)?
How have courts been trying to resolve the tension between publicity
rights and free speech? Because the tort’s elements plausibly regulate so
much protected speech, most of the work in confining the scope of publicity
rights has been done by defenses. 81 Creators of expressive works have raised
a slew of defenses against claims brought by people whose likenesses they
employ, and courts have developed various tests to address these conflicts

74. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit motive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our
cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
75. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988).
76. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d at 970.
77. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); see also Volokh, supra note
32, at 912 & n.35.
78. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.5.1 (3d ed. 2006).
79. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. Id. at 269 (applying this analysis in the context of state defamation law).
81. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1170.
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between publicity rights and free speech. 82 Four distinct defenses have responded to an important yet understudied objection to publicity rights: restricting portrayals of real people in expressive works inhibits speech on matters of public concern.
This Part begins by recounting how First Amendment doctrine and theory have traditionally framed protections for speech on matters of public concern. This tale takes us away from the right of publicity, as much of the
history focuses on free-speech challenges to other torts. We will then return
to publicity rights to explore the four defenses that have emerged in that
realm. 83
A. Educative Free-Speech Theory
Speech on matters of public concern is said to lie “at the core of the First
Amendment.” 84 Sometimes referred to as speech that is “newsworthy” 85 or
about “public issues,” 86 the labels are now interchangeable. 87 No matter what
you call it, courts are loath to uphold laws that restrict this kind of speech. 88
One reason courts hold speech on matters of public concern so dear is
that First Amendment theory and doctrine have lauded access to information
as essential to the public’s ability to engage in self-government. This listener-focused justification “views the public, in its role as the electorate, as
ultimately responsible for political decisions,” and thus the First Amendment
creates a presumption that the public is “entitled to all information that is

82. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
891, 910–19 (2017) (observing that “the First Amendment is invoked to micromanage the application of right of publicity law” and that “[t]he doctrine gets much of its essential shape from courts’
habitual use of free-speech-type defenses, even as the application of these defenses is often incoherent” (emphasis omitted)).
83. See infra Section II.B.
84. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are
classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment.”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980)).
85. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
86. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
87. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 2011) (“‘News’ means information of public concern relating to local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events.”); Richard T. Karcher, Tort
Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 824 (2009) (“Whether something is of a
legitimate public concern turns on a determination of newsworthiness . . . .”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 580 (2007) (observing
that the newsworthiness standard “involves essentially the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test”).
88. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding that speech in a “public
place on a matter of public concern . . . is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment”); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479 (subjecting an antipicketing ordinance to “careful scrutiny”).
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necessary for informed governance.” 89 For many years, the dominant theory
used to explain and justify the First Amendment’s reach relied on this connection between access to information and political self-governance. Let’s
call this theory “educative,” because it focuses on the role that information
plays in educating voters so that they can engage in democratic deliberation—it justifies speech protection not because of any individual right of expression but instead because of the need to create an informed public. 90
As a threshold matter, a helpful way to think of educative theory in contrast to other First Amendment theories is in terms of concern over protecting
the listener versus protecting the speaker. Educative theory is a listener-focused theory because it concerns the public’s right to receive information and
to be informed. In contrast, speaker-based theories focus not on the public’s
ability to use speech as a means to the end of becoming informed, but instead
because it promotes some other value for the speaker. 91
The father of modern educative theory is Alexander Meiklejohn. He
emphasized the role of free speech in enabling people to have access to information in order to make informed political decisions, famously using the
idea of the “town meeting” to explain the First Amendment’s boundaries. 92
At these meetings, he said, citizens “discuss and . . . decide matters of public
policy,” for “[w]hen men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—
who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger” of particular policies. 93 For Meiklejohn, then, “[t]he principle of the freedom of
speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.” 94
Meiklejohn’s theory frames the First Amendment as a means to an end: free
speech is necessary so that citizens can be good listeners and remain informed
about public issues, can hold government accountable, and, ultimately, engage in self-governance. 95 If citizens are not free to learn about and then
89. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 999 (1989).
90. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 55 (arguing that the First Amendment “has no concern
about the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions’” but rather is concerned with “the common
needs of all the members of the body politic”); id. at 56–57, 61 (criticizing Zechariah Chafee, Jr.’s
“inclusion of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amendment,” and Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s “excessive individualism” on this front); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109–23
(1993).
91. See infra notes 129–137 and accompanying discussion.
92. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24,
26 (1948).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 75 (arguing that the First Amendment’s “purpose is to give
to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of
those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal”); MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 92, at 88–89 (“The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall,
so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”).
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discuss matters of public concern, they cannot set political agendas, advance
ideas, and criticize elected officials. But although Meiklejohn’s account
might at first seem to take the speaker into account, his famous phrase shows
us otherwise. The point of free speech, he stressed, is not that everyone shall
speak but that “everything worth saying shall be said.” 96
Meiklejohn’s work greatly influenced later theorists. His disciples include Professor Owen Fiss, who argued that “[t]he purpose of free speech is
not individual self-actualization, but rather the preservation of democracy,
and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of life it wishes to
live.” 97 Thus, according to Fiss, “[w]e allow people to speak so others can
vote” because “[s]peech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware
of all the options and in possession of all the relevant information.” 98 Like
Meiklejohn, then, Fiss viewed any individual speech right in instrumental
terms, worthy of protection “only when it enriches public debate” 99 and
serves “as a means or instrument of collective self-determination.” 100 Professor Cass Sunstein has echoed these sentiments, maintaining that the primary purpose of free speech is to promote deliberative democracy—“a system in which citizens are informed about public issues and able to make
judgments on the basis of reasons.” 101
The principles of educative theory, from Meiklejohn to the modern day,
pervade First Amendment jurisprudence. This is particularly true where tort
liability would pose a threat to free speech, when educative theory has principally appeared in two realms: the public-figure doctrine 102 and the newsworthiness doctrine. 103 Both doctrines reflect listener-based concerns because they “ultimately lead to the same issue, which is the nature of the public

96. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 26; see also id. at 55; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 92, at 25
(“The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness. It does not require
that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even give assurance
that everyone shall have opportunity to do so.”); Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 255 (“The First
Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to speak.’ It is concerned, not with a private right, but with
a public power, a governmental responsibility.”).
97. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409–10 (1986).
98. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 13 (1996).
99. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987).
100. Fiss, supra note 97, at 1409–10.
101. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000); see
also J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935,
1935 (1995).
102. A “public figure” is any person who has “assumed roles of especial prominence in the
affairs of society,” either because they “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence”
or because they “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974).
103. I use this nomenclature for simplicity’s sake, though at times the courts use alternative
language. See supra note 87.
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and its right to demand information.” 104 Thus, the public-figure and newsworthiness doctrines can be glossed as educative doctrines—and courts will
often do so.
Under the public-figure doctrine, speech on public issues receives
heightened protection through a requirement that public-figure plaintiffs satisfy heightened evidentiary burdens in certain tort actions. 105 The doctrine
developed principally in defamation law, beginning with the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 106 Under Sullivan and its progeny, public figures in defamation actions must prove that
the defendant made the allegedly defamatory statement with actual malice—
that is, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” 107 The Court subsequently extended this rule to
tort claims brought by public figures for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, meaning that public-figure plaintiffs who bring these claims must
satisfy the rigors of actual malice if they are to prevail. 108
The rationale behind this heightened burden in the public-figure doctrine derives from listener-based educative concerns. Because public figures
play an important role in society, it is crucial that citizens be fully informed
about them. 109 So strong is this interest that the First Amendment protects
even some false speech about public figures—which is “inevitable in free
debate” 110—because only such a prophylactic rule could foster the “breathing
space” required for the circulation of speech about public issues. 111 Thus, at
its core, the public-figure doctrine adopts an educative theory of the First
Amendment. Indeed, Meiklejohn himself proclaimed that the Sullivan decision was “an occasion for dancing in the streets.” 112

104. Post, supra note 89, at 997.
105. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277, 279–80 (1964).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 279–80 (establishing the rule for public officials); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 274 (1971) (extending the rule to candidates for political office); Curtis Publ’g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending the rule to nonpolitical public figures); see also id.
at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (positing that any differentiation between public figures and officials “would have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy”).
108. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
109. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1964) (“[W]here the criticism is of public
officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the
larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”).
110. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271–72.
111. Id.
112. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125.
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The newsworthiness doctrine, too, acts as a shield for speech on matters
of public concern. 113 Even before the Sullivan Court constitutionalized defamation law because of the importance of “debate on public issues,” 114 the
common-law defamation defense of fair comment and criticism sought to
protect discussion of matters in the public interest. 115 Nowadays, the newsworthiness doctrine has constitutional or quasi-constitutional 116 import in a
wide swath of legal disputes, including cases involving defamation, 117 public
disclosure of private facts, 118 false light, 119 intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 120 copyright, 121 government-employee speech, 122 and freedom of the
press. 123 The doctrine has also been co-opted by a growing number of state
statutes—often dubbed “anti-SLAPP” laws—that offer defendants certain
procedural protections against frivolous lawsuits aimed at chilling speech on
public issues. 124
Like the public-figure doctrine, the newsworthiness doctrine is animated by an educative theory of the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court
explained, people must be free to discuss “all issues about which information
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the

113. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–
02 (1940).
114. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
115. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 831 (5th ed.
1984). As with the public-figure doctrine, defamation law played a salient role in the development
of the newsworthiness doctrine. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated
by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a plurality of the Court attempted to extend
the Sullivan’s standard to all matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a
public or private figure. Id. at 43. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), however,
the majority expressly rejected the extension of the actual-malice standard to private persons caught
up in matters of public concern. Id. at 346. But even the Gertz Court could not bring itself to
jettison newsworthiness entirely. When the Court explored the contours of who would qualify as a
public figure, it remarked that most commonly they would be those people who have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.” Id. at 345 (emphases added). Even on its deathbed, the newsworthiness doctrine
clung on, perhaps to return again when a particular justice found the results of the public-figure
approach intolerable.
116. By “quasi-constitutional,” I refer principally to various newsworthiness defenses or exceptions under state law that aim to avoid First Amendment concerns under federal law. See also infra
Sections III.B.3, III.B.4. But it could also describe instances where federal law is construed to leave
breathing room that might otherwise be required by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that
“[t]he scope of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern”).
117. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
118. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA 123–24 (2008).
119. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
120. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011).
121. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 15 F.3d at 562.
122. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
123. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519, 535 (2001).
124. See, e.g., 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-1 (2012).
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exigencies of their period.” 125 The electorate, as the arbiter of political decisions in a democratic system, relies on information to make educated decisions. 126 The public, therefore, “is presumptively entitled to all information
that is necessary for informed governance.” 127
There is no escaping the fact that a listener-based educative theory underlies much First Amendment doctrine, and that is not going anywhere anytime soon. But for all its widespread adoption and acceptance, the theory
fails to capture something important about the right to free speech. The problem with educative theory is not that it is incorrect—it is that the theory is
incomplete. By single-mindedly protecting speech for the sake of the listener, educative theory misses half of the equation: protecting discussion for
the sake of the speaker. Educative theory subordinates individual expressive
rights to concerns about creating an informed public and, in so doing, undervalues the crucial role that the First Amendment should play in protecting
speakers’ rights to participate in public discourse. To revise Meiklejohn’s
mantra, the objective of free speech should be that everyone may speak, not
merely that everything worth saying gets said. 128
This brings us to the speaker-based theories used to justify First Amendment protection. Professors Robert Post and Jack Balkin have developed
non-educative theories to explain why the First Amendment should protect
our ability to participate in “public discourse”—that is, to participate as a
speaker in the communicative processes that form public opinion. 129 Although it is important to remain informed about public issues, the boundaries
125. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810
(2010).
126. POST, supra note 4, at 77–78.
127. Id. at 78.
128. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 26.
129. For background on the concept of “public discourse” as an animating concern of the First
Amendment, see ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 49 (2014) [hereinafter POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED] (“I shall use the term public discourse to describe the communicative processes by which persons participate in the formation of
public opinion.”); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 15 (2012) [hereinafter POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM]; POST, supra note 4, at 7 (defining public
discourse as “an open structure of communication” in which there can be “reconciliation of individual and collective autonomy”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1210–20 (2016); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory
of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 621 (2011); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (“Public discourse is comprised of those
processes of communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if democratic
legitimacy is to be maintained.”) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech]; Post, supra note 90, at 1115–16 (using the term “public discourse” to refer to the “communicative processes sufficient to instill in citizens a sense of participation, legitimacy, and identification”); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 637–38 (1990)
(defining public discourse as “critical interaction” between members of a community and noting
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of public discourse depend not on the content of speech but rather on the
social function of particular communications. 130 We are “social creatures”
who become who we are “through conversation, through absorbing popular
art and culture, and through being influenced by the ideas and opinions of the
people around [us].” 131 We thus contribute to the formation of public opinion
by expressing our ideas, beliefs, and opinions to one another. This expression
enables us to engage in processes of mutual influence that shape the political
and cultural power in our communities. 132 The objective of free speech, then,
is to protect the speaker’s right to participate in public discourse, not simply
the listener’s right to receive information.
Post and Balkin offer slightly different reasons to explain why the First
Amendment should protect a right to participate in public discourse. Post
ties his theory to the need for democratic legitimacy, which “depends upon
citizens having the warranted belief that their government is responsive to
their wishes.” 133 In order to sustain this belief, citizens in a democracy must
be free to engage in communicative processes that instill a sense of “participation, legitimacy, and identification.” 134 Balkin’s approach does not deny
that participation in public discourse serves this legitimating function in a
democracy. But whereas Post ultimately grounds his theory in political selfgovernance, Balkin’s justification focuses on cultural power, of which political power is but one element. 135 In Balkin’s view, “[p]eople have a right to
participate in forms of power that reshape and alter them because what is
literally at stake is their own selves.” 136 Participation in public discourse empowers people to shape the formation of culture, and for that reason it should
receive the highest constitutional protection. The differences between Post’s
and Balkin’s theories matter not for purposes of this Article. What matters
is their common conviction—one that I share—that people must be free to

that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine looks to this debate to constitute that ‘universe of discourse’ within which public opinion, and hence democratic policy, may be formed”); Robert Post,
An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop.
130. Balkin, supra note 129, at 1214.
131. Id. at 1211.
132. See id. at 1211–12; Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2015) [hereinafter Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment]; Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech
and Democratic Culture]; Madow, supra note 29, at 127, 239.
133. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 129, at 7.
134. Post, supra note 90, at 1115; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (emphasizing the role of free speech in “provid[ing] for participation in decision making by all members of society”); Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
supra note 129, at 7.
135. Balkin, supra note 129, at 1211.
136. Id.
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participate in the formation of public opinion by creating expressive
works. 137
When the purpose of free speech is recast in these terms, the limited
protection offered by educative theory is easier to see. If you justify protecting speech based solely on its ability to inform a listener about matters of
public concern, the theory and the jurisprudence it creates offer less protection to speech that fails to serve an educative function. Hinging speech rights
on conveying information to listeners is a limiting, and damning, approach
for some expressive works: should a work fail to inform a listener, in whatever context that might be, it will not receive robust First Amendment protection. At best, educative theory provides creators of expressive works with
parasitic protection: as speakers, their rights feed off the listener’s right to
receive information, and their rights perish if they fail to convey information
that listeners need to know.
Educative theorists like Meiklejohn have admitted this limitation. When
pushed on why art, for example, might deserve First Amendment protection,
Meiklejohn relied on its ability to assist the voter in making decisions. 138
Self-government, he insisted, “can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.” 139 In his view,
art may help voters develop “knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to human values”—all of which guide our decisions when we vote.140 This meansto-an-end account of the constitutional value of expressive works pegs First
Amendment protection to the works’ ability to assist the public in exercising
political judgment. As Balkin has remarked, in Meiklejohn’s world, “culture
is instrumentally valuable to the extent that it assists political self-governance, by allowing people to understand the issues of the day.” 141 In other
words, the speaker is the listener’s servant.
The listener-based educative theory also creates an additional risk for
free speech: it opens the door to elitism by tying the decision to protect an
expressive work to its ability to “inform” the public. 142 To understand why,
137. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 485–86
(2011); Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 5.
138. Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 255–57.
139. Id. at 255.
140. Id. at 256.
141. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 132, at 1056.
142. Balkin has critiqued the educative theories proffered by the likes of Meiklejohn, Fiss, and
Sunstein in similar terms:
The First Amendment does not protect mass culture for the sake of avant-gardism and
high art; rather it protects the latter because they are part of a larger phenomenon—the
carnival of public discourse and popular culture that arises in a democratized society.
The First Amendment is about Spielberg as much as Bergman, about the Jackson Five as
much as Jackson Pollock, about Rambo as much as Rimbaud. Meiklejohn and his intellectual progeny have always shared this dual failing: Defending art in the name of politics
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it helps to imagine the various educative theorists as falling along a spectrum
based on their answers to a seemingly simple question: What information
does the public need to know? The determination of the informative value
of speech runs along a spectrum between what I call cramped educative theory and capacious educative theory. At one end, the cramped theorists, the
most notable being Robert Bork, argue that “[c]onstitutional protection
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.” 143 Cramped
theorists accept that the public must remain informed about important issues
but adopt a narrow view of what the public needs to know. Meanwhile, at
the other end of the spectrum lie capacious theorists like Meiklejohn who
cram a lot into their informing-the-public box. 144 Like cramped theorists,
capacious theorists laud the need for an informed public, but, unlike cramped
theorists, they see informative value in all sorts of popular culture that Bork
would constitutionally disparage. 145
This educative spectrum invites elitism that undervalues popular culture. This commonly takes the form of “politico-centrism,” which is the tendency to “overstress the importance of politics to the life of ordinary citizens.” 146 Politico-centrists often belittle and devalue speech that is not
clearly linked to electoral politics, and this free-speech myopia creates hazardous conditions for a host of expressive works that primarily seek to entertain rather than inform. 147 That is not to say, of course, that expressive works
cannot do both. Many do. It is just that it is easier for politico-centrists to
hide their elitism when an expressive work serves no obvious informative
function, as is true for many expressive works.

and all art in the name of high art, they inevitably neglect the cultural and condescend
towards the popular.
Balkin, supra note 101, at 1963.
143. Bork, supra note 36, at 20 (emphasis added); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598–99 (1982) (calling Bork’s approach “the most narrowly confined protection of speech ever supported by a modem jurist or academic”).
144. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.
145. Compare Bork, supra note 36, at 20 (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only
to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other
form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic.”), with Meiklejohn, supra note 36, at 257 (justifying protection for “[l]iterature and the
arts” because “[t]hey lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the
values out of which the riches of the general welfare are created”).
146. Balkin, supra note 101, at 1985–86.
147. See id. at 1957–58, 1961 (“For Meiklejohn, art is protected because it serves politics; for
Sunstein art is protected because it is continually threatened by politicians. In both cases, the constitutional value of art is a reflection of its relation to politics—either as its aid or its enemy, either
as its servant or its victim, either as an instrument of its realization or as its familiar and recurrent
prey.”).
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Even capacious educative theorists like Meiklejohn could be accused of
politico-centric elitism, 148 but others have been more flagrant in their disdain
for popular culture and their fondness for politics. Sunstein, for example, has
suggested that nonpolitical art should receive diminished First Amendment
protection, 149 while Bork would not protect nonpolitical art at all. 150 Fiss,
meanwhile, argued that government programs like the National Endowment
for the Arts should promote discussion of public issues by supporting artists
whose works deal with matters of public concern. 151 This proposal sounds
fine in principle, but it takes on a different tone when paired with Fiss’s skepticism about the constitutional value of some popular culture, such as when
he disdainfully contrasts MTV and I Love Lucy with “the information [citizens] need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy, the
structure of government, or the nature of society.” 152 My point is not that we
must ignore that some speech better equips voters to make informed decisions; it is that educative doctrine—which asks courts to pick the information
that voters need to know—is susceptible to elitism that prejudices expressive
works having little to do with electoral politics.
This educative spectrum carries over into the courts, where judges
broadly or narrowly construe what constitutes a matter of public concern. 153
As we will see in greater detail shortly, consider the various state-law exceptions to the right of publicity for speech that is “newsworthy” or in the “public
interest.” 154 The Indiana Supreme Court recently construed Indiana’s newsworthy exception “broadly” to cover the use of college athletes’ names, images, and statistics in conducting fantasy-sports games. 155 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, adopted a narrow under-

148. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at xv–xvi (lamenting that privately owned television
broadcasters were “dangerous” to the public’s “morality and intelligence” because they were “destroying and degrading our intelligence and our taste by the use of instruments which should be
employed in educating and uplifting them”); Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment,
supra note 132, at 1056 (ascribing the “politico-centric” label to Meiklejohn’s theory of the First
Amendment).
149. SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 153–59; see also id. at 84–91 (belittling “low quality” television programming that appeals to tastes of uneducated).
150. Bork, supra note 36, at 26–28.
151. FISS, supra note 36, at 40–45.
152. Fiss, supra note 99, at 788; see also Fiss, supra note 97, at 1413 (“From the perspective of
a free and open debate, the choice between Love Boat and Fantasy Island is trivial.”).
153. This judicial inconsistency is likely exacerbated by the fact that the term is ambiguously
defined both normatively (what the public ought to know) and descriptively (what the public wants
to know). See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (defining a “matter of public concern”
as speech that is “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community” or “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of
value and concern to the public” (first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); then
quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004))); Post, supra note 35, at 1057.
154. See infra Section II.B.3.
155. Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 396 (Ind. 2018).
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standing of California’s analogous exception, holding that a videogame featuring college athletes did not concern “matters in the public interest” because it was merely “a game, not a reference source,” and involved no “publication or reporting” of “factual information” or “factual data.” 156 Bork
would have smiled at the Ninth Circuit’s judicial line-drawing, while Meiklejohn may well have frowned.
B. Educative Defenses to Publicity Rights
Over the years, educative theory has crept into the realm of the right of
publicity. 157 Four listener-based educative defenses have emerged: (1) a constitutional affirmative defense to shield expressive works relating to matters
156. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.),
724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013).
157. See, e.g., id. at 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (considering newsworthiness and ultimately rejecting the defense); Stayart v. Google Inc., 710 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that,
under Wisconsin law, the “newsworthiness” exception applies “where a matter of legitimate public
interest is concerned” (quoting Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447
N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989))); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (considering newsworthiness and
finding persuasive that there was “substantial public interest”); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d
395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that courts faced with publicity claims have “recognize[d]
two closely related yet analytically distinct privileges”: (1) “the privilege to publish or broadcast
facts, events, and information relating to public figures,” and (2) “the privilege to publish or broadcast news or other matters of public interest”); Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1249
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that, under California law, “[n]o right of publicity cause of action ‘will
lie for the publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know
and the freedom of the press to tell it’” (quoting Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994,
1001 (9th Cir. 2001))); Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1355 (D. Colo. 2014)
(explaining that, under Colorado law, there is a “privilege that permits the use of a plaintiff’s name
or likeness when that use is made in the context of, and reasonably relates to, a publication concerning a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern” (quoting Joe Dickerson & Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001))); Somerson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc.,
956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–67 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (explaining that, under Georgia law, the “newsworthiness” exception applies “where an incident is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter
of a public investigation” (quoting Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th
Cir. 2009))); Peckham v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D. Mass. 2012)
(explaining that, under Massachusetts law, the “newsworthiness” defense applies if “the publication
touches upon a matter of ‘legitimate public concern’”); Arenas v. Shed Media U.S. Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that, under California law, the “public interest
defense” extends to publications about “people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living,
professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities”
(quoting Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001)); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1097 (D. Haw. 2007) (explaining that, under Hawaii law, “newsworthiness” reflects “a line . . . to
be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled,
and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern” (quoting
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975))); Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc.,
No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (considering public-figure
status and ultimately concluding that the plaintiff’s escapades made him a “notorious public figure”); Leviston v. Jackson, 980 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (explaining that, under New
York law, a plaintiff cannot recover “if the use to which his or her image was put is in the context
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of public concern; 158 (2) a constitutional requirement that public-figure plaintiffs prove “actual malice” in order to prevail on their publicity claims; 159 (3)
state-law exceptions to the right of publicity for portrayals that are “newsworthy” or in the “public interest”; 160 and (4) a method of constitutional
avoidance in which courts narrowly construe publicity tort elements to evade
certain free-speech concerns. 161
The unfortunate takeaway is that, despite the ostensible protection provided by these four defenses, the outcome is unfavorable for many creators
of expressive works who portray real people. Plaintiffs often prevail unless
their publicity claim would harm the public’s ability to remain informed
about matters of public concern. 162 Thus, as with the educative defenses to
other torts, these four defenses provide limited, parasitic protection to speakers. 163 The result is that creators of expressive works can be prevented from
portraying real people in public discourse.
1. The Constitutional Affirmative Defense
The first educative challenge arises when defendants raise the First
Amendment as an affirmative defense to liability under the right of publicity.
Under this defense, an expressive work portraying a real person might get
constitutional protection if the person portrayed is a public figure or the portrayal relates to a newsworthy event.
In Leopold v. Levin, 164 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment barred a claim brought by convicted murderer Nathan
Leopold against the creators of a book and movie about his crime. 165 Because
Leopold’s crime remained “an American cause celèbre” and a “matter of
of reporting a newsworthy incident”); see also Jesse Koehler, Fraley v. Facebook: The Right of
Publicity in Online Social Networks, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 963, 967–68 (2013).
158. See infra Section II.B.1.
159. See infra Section II.B.2.
160. See infra Section II.B.3.
161. See infra Section II.B.4.
162. See Dogan, supra note 28, at 29 (asserting that courts will generally protect expressive
works against publicity claims when those works are “perceived as newsworthy and informational”). In some of the decisions discussed below, the courts did not denominate the right as a
“right of publicity.” This is particularly true for several older cases, where the court conceived of
the unauthorized use as implicating the right of privacy. See generally Madow, supra note 29, at
167–78 (discussing the historical interplay between the rights of privacy and publicity); Robert C.
Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 647 (1991) (exploring the relationship between privacy and property interests in the misappropriation and publicity torts). For purposes of discussing educative challenges to the right to
prevent unauthorized use of one’s image, the label of “privacy” or “publicity” does not matter. For
the sake of clarity, I will refer to the tort as the “right of publicity” throughout.
163. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1170 (“Some states have created protections for news reporting and some creative works, but those are often quite limited.”).
164. 259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970).
165. Id. at 254.
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public interest,” and because of Leopold’s “consequent and continuing status
as a public figure,” the court explained that his publicity rights had to give
way to the creators’ First Amendment rights.166 These rights rested on educative justifications about the public’s “strong curiosity and social and news
interest in the crime.” 167
Similarly, in Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 168 a federal
district court relied upon the First Amendment when considering an actress’s
claim against a magazine that published photos of her without her consent. 169
The court noted that the right of publicity “can be severely circumscribed as
a result of an individual’s newsworthiness” 170 and explained that constitutional concerns could override New York’s right of publicity, “especially in
the context of persons denominated ‘public figures,’ so as ‘to avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and
matters of public interest’ guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 171 These
educative concerns meant that publicity rights would “rarely” prevail when a
person’s name or picture is used “in the context of an event within the ‘orbit
of public interest and scrutiny’”—a category that includes “most of the events
involving a public figure.” 172 Because the photos informed the public about
“a newsworthy event,” the court held that the First Amendment barred the
actress’s claim. 173
But defendants’ pleas for an affirmative constitutional shield have not
always been successful. In Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night
Co., 174 for example, a federal district court denied First Amendment protection to a play featuring performers who imitated the style and appearance of
the Marx Brothers. 175 The play portrayed the famous comedic troupe “in a
new situation and with original lines,” 176 but the court held that the First
Amendment defense did not apply because the play was neither “biographical” nor “an attempt to convey information about the Marx Brothers themselves or about the development of their characters.”177 In other words, the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 255. For an analogous, and more contemporary, example from a different court, see
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *2–*4, (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 27, 2014) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim “cannot survive defendants’ First Amendment defense” in part because his escapades as the “Dictator of Panama” made him a “notorious public
figure”).
168. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
169. Id. at 404.
170. Id. at 405.
171. Id. at 404 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967)).
172. Id. at 405 (quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977)).
173. Id. at 405–06.
174. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
175. Id. at 493.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 494; see also Groucho Marx Prods., Inc., 689 F.2d at 319.
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play was unprotected because it failed to serve educative goals of informing
the public about the real-life Marx Brothers. 178
2. The Constitutional Actual-Malice Requirement
Educative theory has also affected publicity through judicial importation of the constitutional actual-malice standard from defamation law. 179
Some courts have held that public-figure plaintiffs who are portrayed in
“news or material of public concern” may prevail only if the portrayal constituted a “false statement of fact” that the defendant published with
“knowledge of its falsity” or “reckless disregard of its truth.” 180

178. The California Supreme Court, too, has raised the public-figure and newsworthiness doctrines and yet ruled against defendants raising a First Amendment defense. In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), the court expressed its concern that
“[g]iving broad scope to the right of publicity has the potential of allowing a celebrity to accomplish
through the vigorous exercise of that right the censorship of unflattering commentary that cannot be
constitutionally accomplished through defamation actions.” Id. at 803–04. The court even stressed
that, “[o]nce the celebrity thrusts himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment
dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad scope.” Id. at 807. Ultimately, though, the court ruled that the
portrayal—a charcoal drawing of “The Three Stooges” comedy trio—was not sufficiently “transformative” to get First Amendment protection. Id. at 811.
179. See Russell Hickey, Refashioning Actual Malice: Protecting Free Speech in the Right of
Publicity Era, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1101, 1117 (2006) (“If . . . the work is classified
as pure speech, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving actual malice. Otherwise, the possibility remains that public figure plaintiffs will increasingly exploit the right of publicity as a means
for curtailing legitimate speech that should otherwise be fully protected under the First Amendment.”).
180. William O’Neil & Co. v. Validea.com Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(“Because [the book about the public-figure plaintiff] involves matters of public concern, [his] complaint can only be sustained if it alleges that [the publisher defendant] acted with ‘actual malice’ in
publishing it. That is, . . . with knowledge that it contains false statements of fact, or with reckless
disregard for the truth.”). There are numerous other examples of plaintiffs employing the actualmalice standard as a shield against the right of publicity. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692
F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a publisher may be liable under the right of publicity
if it knowingly or recklessly “falsely claim[s] that the public figure endorses that news medium”);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d on other
grounds, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue with
respect to actual malice, . . . Plaintiff cannot sustain her claim for misappropriation of the right to
publicity.”); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that “a defendant publisher may assert that the actual malice standard applies to claims for
commercial misappropriation”); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that a documentary featuring a well-known surfer was “constitutionally protected in the absence of a showing that the publishers knew that their statements were false or published them in reckless disregard of the truth”); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, No. ED 78785, 2002 WL
1610972, at *14 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002), rev’d, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (“Before [the
plaintiff] can recover on his right of publicity claim he must, therefore, satisfy the New York Times
‘actual malice’ standard, knowledge that the statements are false or in reckless disregard of their
truth.”).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for instance,
required a showing of actual malice when actor Dustin Hoffman sued a magazine that altered a photo of him from the movie Tootsie as part of a composite of celebrities sporting the latest fashion trends. 181 Hoffman’s photo appeared in an article entitled Grand Illusions, for which the magazine had
“used computer technology to alter famous film stills to make it appear that
the actors were wearing Spring 1997 fashions.” 182 In the original photo from
Tootsie, Hoffman had been wearing a red sequined dress, but the magazine
modified the image to put him in a different designer gown. 183 When analyzing Hoffman’s claim under California’s right of publicity, the court explained that, because Hoffman was a public figure, he had to show actual
malice—that is, he had to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the magazine “intended to create the false impression in the minds of its readers that when they saw the altered ‘Tootsie’ photograph they were seeing
Hoffman’s body.” 184 Because the court concluded that Hoffman could not
satisfy that burden, the First Amendment barred his claim. 185
Although the magazine was ultimately successful in rebuffing Hoffman’s claim in that appeal, the decision in the district court—and even the
analysis in the court of appeals—shows that victory was far from certain. 186
The district court explained that the magazine “fabricated” the photo and
published it “knowing it was false.” 187 By “false,” the court meant that the
magazine knew that Hoffman had “never worn the designer clothes he was
depicted as wearing” and that it was “not even his body” in the photo.188
These findings were, of course, factually correct—the magazine had purposefully edited the photo to replace Hoffman’s body and change his attire,
as it had done with the other celebrities in the composite.189 Because the
magazine admitted that “it intended to create the false impression in the
minds of the public that they were seeing Mr. Hoffman’s body,” the district
court held that Hoffman had shown actual malice and, as a result, the First
Amendment offered no defense against the right of publicity. 190 The court of
appeals reversed only after engaging in a fact-intensive inquiry about whether

181. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001).
182. Id. at 1183.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1187.
185. Id. at 1189.
186. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873–75 (C.D. Cal.
1999), rev’d, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89.
187. Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
188. Id.
189. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89.
190. Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the magazine’s editors had knowingly or recklessly misled readers into believing that Hoffman had actually posed for the photo. 191 Thus, although the
courts asked different falsity-related questions, they both conditioned constitutional protection on whether the magazine had knowingly or recklessly
conveyed false information to the public by publishing an intentionally fictionalized photo.
Where movie star Dustin Hoffmann failed, baseball player Warren
Spahn prevailed. In a case brought against the author of a fiction-infused
book that featured Spahn, New York’s highest court applied the actual-malice standard to decide whether the author violated Spahn’s publicity rights. 192
The author admitted that he had “fictionalized and dramatized” aspects of
Spahn’s life so that the book would appeal to “a juvenile readership.” 193 This
included “imaginary incidents, manufactured dialogue and a manipulated
chronology,” 194 all of which the author insisted were important and common
“literary techniques” of the genre. 195 Yet it was these very techniques—“invented dialogue, imaginary incidents, and attributed thoughts and feelings”—that the court declared were sufficient to show actual malice. 196 The
court explained that a public figure seeking recovery for “unauthorized
presentation of his life” must show “that the presentation is infected with
material and substantial falsification and that the work was published with
knowledge of such falsification or with a reckless disregard for the truth.” 197
One passage in particular reveals how the court turned the book’s intentional
dramatization against the author:
Exactly how it may be argued that the “all-pervasive” use of imaginary incidents—incidents which the author knew did not take
place—invented dialogue—dialogue which the author knew had
never occurred—and attributed thoughts and feelings—thoughts
and feelings which were likewise the figment of the author’s imagination—can be said not to constitute knowing falsity is not
made clear by the defendants. Indeed, the arguments made here
are, in essence, not a denial of knowing falsity but a justification
for it. 198
This actual-malice inquiry in Spahn shows the limited protection that
this educative defense provides to creators of expressive works that feature
fictional elements. The court chastised the author for his lack of “research
191. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89.
192. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967).
193. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 221 N.E. 2d
543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated sub nom. Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn., 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
194. Id.
195. See Spahn, 233 N.E. 2d at 842.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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effort” after he “admitted that he never interviewed Mr. Spahn, any member
of his family, or any baseball player who knew Spahn,” and that he “did not
even attempt to obtain information from the Milwaukee Braves, the team for
which Mr. Spahn toiled for almost two decades.” 199 The court had already
alluded to these failings in educative terms in an earlier opinion in the same
litigation, explaining that “[n]o public interest is served by protecting the dissemination” of fictional works, which are “quite different” from “[t]he free
speech which is encouraged and essential to the operation of a healthy government.” 200 In other words, the court faulted the author for failing to ascertain—and then convey—truthful and actual information about Spahn to the
public.
3. State-Law “Newsworthiness” and “Public Interest” Exceptions
Educative theory has also influenced publicity claims through state-law
exceptions for portrayals that are “newsworthy” or in “the public interest.” 201
Defendants may raise these exceptions as a defense that is distinct from any
First Amendment argument they might make, for the two protections are not
necessarily coextensive. 202 Although courts often rely on First Amendment
principles in construing these exceptions, their application is a matter of state
law. 203
Where states have recognized common-law publicity rights, courts have
often crafted judicial exceptions for newsworthy uses. 204 The Georgia Supreme Court adopted such an exception for portrayals related to “an incident
199. Id. at 843.
200. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E. 2d 543, 546 (N.Y. 1966).
201. See Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“In recognition
of the potential clash between the First Amendment and the right of publicity, courts and legislators
carve out a public affairs or newsworthiness exception to the right.”); Eastwood v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that “[p]ublication of matters in the
public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and the freedom of the press to tell it,
cannot ordinarily be actionable,” and thus speech on “a matter of public concern . . . would generally
preclude the imposition of liability” under the right of publicity).
202. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10, 310 n.10
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting that California’s Section 334(d) “public affairs” exception to the right of
publicity “is not coextensive with the First Amendment” but rather “is designed to avoid First
Amendment questions . . . by providing extra breathing space for the use of a person’s name in
connection with matters of public interest”).
203. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.),
724 F.3d 1268, 1282 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that California’s common-law and statutory exceptions “are based on First Amendment concerns” but “are not coextensive with the Federal Constitution,” and so “their application is thus a matter of state law” (citations omitted)).
204. Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *9 (S.D.W. Va.
Feb. 19, 2008) (“Courts have engrafted exceptions and restrictions to the rights of publicity and
privacy in order to ‘avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy
events, and matters of public interest,’ guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (quoting Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967))); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Courts have been consistently unwilling to recognize the right of
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[that] is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation.” 205 Many states now guarantee similar exceptions by statute. 206 Indiana law, for example, exempts portrayals in “[m]aterial that has political or
newsworthy value” 207 and “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of
an event or a topic of general or public interest.” 208
In California—a state where celebrity plaintiffs often seek to enforce
publicity rights—statutory and common-law exceptions exist to serve educative ends. As a statutory matter, the right of publicity does not apply to portrayals connected to “any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account,
or any political campaign.” 209 And under California’s common-law “public
interest” defense, “no cause of action will lie for the publication of matters in
the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know and the
freedom of the press to tell it.” 210 Some courts have suggested that this defense is limited in scope, extending only to “reporting of recent events.” 211
Other courts, however, have stressed that the defense is “not limited to news
stories on current events” because “[e]ntertainment features receive the same
constitutional protection as factual news reports.” 212
publicity cause of action where the plaintiff’s name or picture was used in connection with a matter
of public interest.”).
205. Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ga. 1956); see also Somerson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“The right to publicity is in tension
with freedoms of speech and the press guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . . . . In order to carefully balance these rights against the right of publicity, the Georgia courts
have adopted a ‘newsworthiness’ exception to the right of publicity.”).
206. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-761, 13-3726 (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08
(West 2017); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/35 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214,
§ 3A (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.09 (LexisNexis 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449
(West 2017); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316(e)(2) (2017); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012 (West
2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.070 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 2017).
207. IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B) (2017).
208. Id. § 32-36-1-1(c)(3).
209. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(j) (2017).
210. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 912 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Montana v. San Jose
Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995)).
211. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001).
212. Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 681 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 2001)); see also Dryer v.
Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1198 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir.
2016) (explaining that, under Texas law, the “newsworthiness defense” is “broad and extends beyond subjects of political or public affairs to all matters of the kind customarily regarded as ‘news’
and all matters giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, where the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published”); Edme v. Internet Brands, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that,
under New York law, “‘newsworthiness’ is applied broadly . . . and includes not only descriptions
of actual events, but also articles concerning political happenings, social trends or any subject of
public interest”); Arenas v. Shed Media U.S. Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1191–92 (C.D. Cal. 2011),
aff’d, 462 F. App’x 709 (9th Cir. 2011); Nichols v. Moore, 334 F. Supp. 2d 944, 956 (E.D. Mich.
2004) (explaining that courts in various jurisdictions “have been consistently unwilling to recognize
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In a prominent case involving the application of these state-law exceptions to expressive works, the Ninth Circuit in Keller v. Electronic Arts,
Inc. 213 adopted a cramped interpretation of California’s exceptions and concluded that they did not apply to a videogame featuring real-life college athletes playing in games that had never actually occurred. 214 Although the
court acknowledged that California law provides that the right of publicity
does not apply to “newsworthy items” and “matters in the public interest,”
the court held that the videogame’s creators could be liable because the videogame did not involve the “publication or reporting” of “factual information” or “factual data.” 215 The court explained that the videogame “is a
means by which users can play their own virtual football games, not a means
for obtaining information about real-world football games.” 216 Although the
videogame’s creators had incorporated “actual player information”—such as
the players’ real heights and weights—their invocation of the state-law exceptions was “considerably weakened” because they failed to include the
players’ names alongside their likenesses and statistical data. 217 The court
held that the exceptions did not apply because the videogame “is not a publication of facts about college football; it is a game, not a reference source.” 218
In short, the videogame served no informative function and thus served no
educative end.
A federal district court in Ohio sang a similar tune in Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 219 where the court narrowly construed the statutory exceptions
under Ohio and Florida law in a case involving a renowned television news
anchor videotaped at a wet t-shirt contest. 220 The court granted the news anchor’s request to enjoin a website from making the footage available online,
holding that the state-law exceptions did not apply because the footage did
not “contain any editorial content” and was “not accompanied by any dialog
discussing Plaintiff’s status as a former news anchor.” 221 Likewise, in

the right of publicity cause of action where the plaintiff’s name or picture was used in connection
with a matter of public interest, be it news or entertainment”).
213. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
214. Id. at 1282–83.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
220. Id. at 921 (“A use of an aspect of an individual’s persona in connection with any news,
public affairs, sports broadcast, or account does not constitute a use for which consent is required.”
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 2741.02(D)(1))); id. (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to:
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any newspaper,
magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any
bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such
name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes.” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 540.08)).
221. Id. at 927.
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Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 222 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the exception under
Oklahoma law “provide[d] no haven” for portrayals of professional baseball
players on parody trading cards. 223 The court recognized that the cards were
“commentary on an important social institution” and “provide[d] social commentary on public figures,” but it nonetheless held that the exception did not
apply because the players’ likenesses were not used “in connection with any
news account.” 224
Finally, even when courts have recognized that an expressive work relates to public issues, these state-law exemptions do not necessarily provide
a defense if the plaintiff’s identity was used in a “knowingly false manner.” 225
As a result, in Browne v. McCain, 226 the federal district court rejected presidential candidate John McCain’s motion to dismiss a publicity claim against
a singer, Jackson Browne, whose song McCain’s campaign used in a political
commercial. 227 The court accepted that Browne’s voice was “sufficiently
distinctive and widely known” that the use of his song “could constitute use
of his identity.” 228 Because Browne had not given McCain permission to use
the song, he argued that using it implied an endorsement of McCain’s candidacy, when in fact Browne had been a strong supporter of Barack Obama. 229
The court allowed Browne’s claim to proceed. 230
4. Judicial Construction of Tort Elements
The final influence that educative theory has had on the right of publicity comes through judicial interpretation of the tort’s elements. Several
courts have fretted over the constitutional implications of broad publicity
rights. 231 To assuage these concerns, they have narrowly construed elements
to avoid liability for speech about matters of public concern. 232

222. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
223. Id. at 968 (explaining that Oklahoma’s “news” exception “exempts use of a person’s identity in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign, from the dictates of the statute” (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1449(D))).
224. Id. at 968–69. The court ultimately concluded for separate reasons that the cards were
protected under the First Amendment. See id. at 968–76.
225. Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Solano v. Playgirl,
Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Solano, 292 F.3d at 1089 (holding that “the
newsworthiness privileges do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name and likeness in a
knowingly false manner to increase sales of the publication”).
226. 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
227. Id. at 1065.
228. Id. at 1070.
229. Id. at 1065, 1067.
230. Id. at 1073.
231. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (Sup. Ct. 1968),
aff’d, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969).
232. Id.
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For example, under New York law, the unauthorized portrayal must be
for “the purposes of trade” for there to be liability. 233 New York courts have
long recognized “[t]he dominance of the public interest in obtaining information about public figures” and have construed the statute’s “trade” element
accordingly. 234 Thus, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 235 the New York Supreme Court explained that “[t]he publication of a
newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful news or other factual
information to the public does not fall within ‘the purposes of trade’ contemplated by the New York statute . . . .” 236 Similarly, in Paulsen v. Personality
Posters, Inc., 237 the court noted that “dissemination of news or information
concerning matters of public interest” does not constitute a use for “the purposes of trade.” 238
Despite this sweeping language in favor of free speech, these narrowing
constructions have been used against creators of expressive works that contain fictional elements. New York’s highest court has stressed that a work
“may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception.” 239 In
Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 240 the defendant produced a film based
233. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019).
234. Rosemont Enters., Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 127, 129.
235. Id. at 127.
236. Id. at 128–29 (“Because of [First Amendment] considerations, a public figure can have no
exclusive rights to his own life story, and others need no consent or permission of the subject to
write a biography of a celebrity.”); see also Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing
& Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining that, under New York law, “a newsworthy
article is not deemed produced for the purposes of advertising or trade”); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952) (“It has long been recognized that the use of name or picture
in a newspaper, magazine, or newsreel, in connection with an item of news or one that is newsworthy, is not a use for purposes of trade within the meaning of the [New York] Civil Rights Law.”).
237. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
238. Id. at 506. In a sense, the statutory state-law exceptions discussed in the previous subsection are a legislative analog to the judicial carve outs discussed in this subsection. See, e.g., William
O’Neil & Co. v. Validea.com Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that,
under California statutory law, “a use of a name, photograph or likeness in connection with any
news . . . shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation”); Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that, under California common law, if a
use falls within the statutory “news” exception, it is not actionable under common law because
“[p]ublication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and
the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable”).
239. Messenger ex rel. Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 555. This rule also applies to discussion of
real people in newspaper articles. In 1937, in Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1937), the New York Supreme Court explained that an unauthorized use would not be for “purposes of trade”—and, accordingly, would be protected by the newsworthiness doctrine—if it was
connected to “an article of current news or immediate public interest,” but the use would lose protection under the doctrine if paired with an “article of fiction.” Id. at 388–89. If an article’s contents
were “neither strictly news items nor strictly fictional in character,” the court announced that the
“general rule” was that the use was protected by the newsworthiness doctrine if the articles were
“educational and informative in character.” Id. at 389.
240. 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913).
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on true events about a wireless operator whose heroics helped rescue passengers from a shipwrecked boat. 241 The real wireless operator sued the
filmmaker for portraying him without his permission. 242 The court recognized that the film was “mainly a product of the imagination,” even though it
was based “largely upon such information relating to [the] actual occurrence
as could readily be obtained.” 243 This finding was fatal for the filmmaker.
Although truthfully “recounting or portraying an actual current event” would
be protected, the court explained that this film was designed to “amuse” the
audience rather than to “instruct or educate” them. 244 Later courts have buttressed this distinction by emphasizing that the protection for a “newsworthy”
portrayal of a public figure “does not extend to commercialization of his personality through a form of treatment distinct from the dissemination of news
or information.” 245
Similarly, in Hicks v. Casablanca Records,246 the heir and assignees of
mystery writer Agatha Christie sought to enjoin the distribution of the film
and book Agatha. 247 The federal district court ruled that the works were fictional and not biographical, and that the inclusion of some “facts” did not
make the works “newsworthy.” 248 This kind of educative reasoning, whereby
creators of expressive works are denied protection when their work does not
inform the public about actual events, remains influential to this day. Just
last year, a New York appellate court revived a claim against the filmmakers
of Romeo Killer: The Christopher Porco Story. 249 Christopher Porco, who
had been convicted of murdering his father and attempting to murder his
mother, alleged that the film was a “knowing and substantially fictionalized
account” of his life. 250 That allegation alone defeated the argument that the
film was entitled to the protection for “reports of newsworthy events or matters of public interest.” 251

241. Id. at 1109.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1110.
244. Id. at 1110–11.
245. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952); see also Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 14 N.E.2d 636, 636–37 (N.Y. 1938); Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 98 N.Y.S.2d
233, 234–35 (App. Div. 1950); Franklin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 96, 96–98 (App.
Div. 1935), aff’d, 2 N.E.2d 691 (1936).
246. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
247. Id. at 427, 431.
248. Id.at 427.
249. Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y.S.3d 769, 770–72 (App. Div. 2017).
250. Id. at 1255.
251. See id. at 1254 (quoting Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g,
727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000)).
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C. Why Trump Might Win
The four defenses discussed above suffer from the same limitation that
plagues educative theory more generally: the premise that the speaker’s value
is contingent on his ability to inform the listener. My qualm is not with the
idea that creating an informed public capable of self-government is an unworthy goal, but rather with the mandate that speech serve a narrow informative function in order to gain protection. This emphasis undervalues speakers’ expressive interests and encourages politico-centric elitism. There are,
of course, some portrayals of real people in expressive works that advance
educative goals, or at least one could tell a plausible story for why they do.
But as we have seen, educative defenses have offered incomplete and, at
times, unpersuasive protection against the right of publicity. This leaves creators of expressive works vulnerable when they portray real people.
To hone in on why educative defenses are ill-suited to protect expressive
works against publicity claims, some examples will be useful. There is no
need for hypotheticals—as luck would have it, two interesting publicity problems have been offered by the same person: Donald Trump.
In 2011, when Trump was a real-estate magnate, reality-television celebrity, and billionaire, but not yet a candidate for political office, rapper Mac
Miller released a song titled “Donald Trump.” 252 Miller rapped about his
plans to “[t]ake over the world” while “on [his] Donald Trump shit,” encouraging us to “[l]ook at all this money” because “[a]in’t that some shit?” 253
Trump took umbrage at the use of his name, implying on Twitter that Miller
had violated his right of publicity:
Little @MacMiller —I don’t need your praise . . . just pay me
the money you owe. 254
Little @MacMiller, you illegally used my name for your song
‘Donald Trump’ which now has over 75 million hits. 255
Little @MacMiller, I want the money not the plaque you gave
me! 256
Little @MacMiller, I’m now going to teach you a big boy lesson
about lawsuits and finance. You ungrateful dog! 257
252. Dave Gilson, Most Presidents Ignore Products That Rip off Their Names. Will Trump?,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/trump-name-publicity-rights/.
253. Mac Miller, Donald Trump, on BEST DAY EVER (Rostrum Records, LLC 2011).
254. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:09 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297043874369650688.
255. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:45 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297083228706201600.
256. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:50 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297084584334589952.
257. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2013, 1:03 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/297087613851017216.
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Miller’s song was not Trump’s only experience with his identity being
used in an expressive work. As we saw earlier, Illma Gore’s Make America
Great Again painting prompted Trump to threaten Gore with a lawsuit. 258
These two examples provide insight into the perils of relying on educative defenses to shield expressive works. Artists like Miller and Gore might
have had reason to worry. 259 As we have seen, educative defenses pose problems for creators of expressive works for two main reasons. First, by focusing on the rights of listeners to receive information, they give short shrift to
the expressive interests of speakers. Second, they invite politico-centric elitism that valorizes speech about politics and supposedly “serious” public issues and undervalues popular culture. Even if the defenses could fend off
Trump’s publicity claims, the arguments that Miller and Gore would have
had to make in the process could imperil other creators of expressive works
whose claims to educative protection are more tenuous.
As the cases discussed in the previous section reveal, creators of expressive works who invoke educative defenses usually prevail only if their works
convey information that courts consider to be valuable for democratic deliberation. 260 This can be a tough standard to meet for expressive works—particularly those that are fictional, abstract, or nonverbal. That is not to say it
is impossible. But when serious consequences can result from liability, 261 an
unclear and unpredictable standard will have a chilling effect.
Consider Miller’s rap: “Take over the world when I’m on my Donald
Trump shit /Look at all this money! Ain’t that some shit?” 262 Miller uses
Trump’s name not as a way to impart any information about Trump, except
perhaps that Miller saw Trump as a figure synonymous with success. The
song was written years before Trump became president, and the lyrics suggest no connection to a particular political or public issue. At most, then, the

258. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, Gore’s painting could not be
reprinted here for publication-related reasons, but its omission should not be construed as diminishing Gore’s talent or the painting’s majesty. For those eager to feast their eyes on the masterpiece,
the internet is a wonderful place. See Make America Great Again, ILLMA GORE, http://illmagore.com/work-1/#/798817030644/ (last visited June 7, 2019).
259. For a delightful assortment of Trump-related advertisements that might raise concerns under the right of publicity, see Mark Duffy, President Trump, Negative Advertising Linchpin,
MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2019), https://medium.com/@copyranter/https-medium-com-copyranter-president-trump-negative-advertising-linchpin-f8402e7923b1 (cataloguing the ads and noting that
“Trump has been used to sell everything from the Salvation Army to Sushi to toner cartridges”).
Not only are none of the over fifty brand ads featuring Trump “official,” but “almost all of them
have used him in a negative light.” Id. Given Trump’s history of litigating unflattering portrayals,
the makers of these ads might want to consult their lawyers.
260. See supra Section II.B.
261. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
262. Miller, supra note 253.
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use of Trump’s name serves as a “common point[] of reference” 263 or “symbol[]” 264 for wealth. That is how Miller saw it, too. When explaining why
he chose to invoke Trump’s name, he said that Trump “was just somebody
who symbolized financial success to everybody at that time,” 265 and that the
line could have easily been “Take over the world when I’m on my Bill Gates
shit.” 266 Any educative rationale is thin.
As for Gore’s painting, it is again difficult (though not impossible) to
credibly assert that it conveys information that the public needs to make political decisions. Gore says that Make America Great Again was created to
evoke a reaction from its audience, good or bad, about the significance we
place on our physical selves.” 267 She continued: “One should not feel emasculated by their penis size or vagina, as it does not define who you are. Your
genitals do not define your gender, your power, or your status.” 268 If we take
Gore’s word for it, her painting was not directly tied to Trump’s candidacy
for the presidency, nor was it supposed to convey accurate information about
him. Rather, Gore used Trump’s image as a way to comment on the role that
a physical characteristic can have on our conceptions of ourselves.
It is conceivable, of course, that a court would protect Miller and Gore
under one of the educative defenses. Even before Trump ran for office, he
was a public figure with considerable influence in the business world, and
Miller’s rap is, in some sense, a commentary about that influence. And although Gore’s painting does not explicitly critique Trump’s candidacy, titling
it with the campaign’s motto—“Make America Great Again” 269—obviously
entangles it with his political persona. But we could also imagine Trump
citing cases like Keller to argue that neither the rap nor the painting was a

263. JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990) (characterizing celebrities as “common points of
reference for millions of individuals who may never interact with one another, but who share, by
virtue of their participation in a mediated culture, a common experience and a collective memory”);
see also Marshall McLuhan, Sight, Sound, and the Fury, in MASS CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS
IN AMERICA 489, 495 (Bernard Rosenberg & David M. White eds., 1957) (referring to celebrities
as “points of collective awareness and communication”).
264. RICHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY viii (1985)
(characterizing celebrities as a “principal source of motive power in putting across ideas of every
kind—social, political, aesthetic, moral,” and as “symbols for these ideas”).
265. Kia Makarechi, Mac Miller, Donald Trump’s Least Favorite Rapper, Revisits Feud,
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/01/mac-miller-donaldtrump-feud.
266. Lauren Nostro, Donald Trump Threatens Mac Miller with Lawsuit, Calls Him an “Ungrateful Dog,” COMPLEX (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.complex.com/music/2013/01/donald-trumpthreatens-to-sue-mac-miller.
267. Make America Great Again, ILLMA GORE, http://illmagore.com/work-1/#/798817030644/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (emphasis added).
268. Id.
269. About, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/about/ (last
visited June 7, 2019).

2019]

DRAWING TRUMP NAKED

937

“publication or reporting” of “factual information” or “factual data,” 270 or
citing Binns to claim that the works were “mainly a product of the imagination” that were designed to “amuse” rather than to “instruct or educate” the
public. 271 Trump could quote from Bosley to highlight that neither work
“contain[s] any editorial content” or “dialog discussing [his] status” as a business mogul or political candidate. 272 He could even concede that the works
constituted “commentary on an important social institution” and “commentary on public figures,” as the court did in Cardtoons, and yet still maintain
that Miller and Gore are liable because they did not use his name and likeness
“in connection with any news account.” 273 And, at the risk of being salacious,
Trump might even contend that Gore’s painting is unprotected because it creates a “false impression” about certain aspects of his physique. 274
Setting aside the real-world Trump examples for a moment, imagine if
an aspiring novelist wanted to publish a fictional book about corruption in
Atlantic City in the 1990s. One of the novelist’s characters, Ronald Grump,
owns a hotel and casino in the city called Grump Plaza. Grump is a sympathetic character, though he is prone to embarrassing gaffes, and his competitors like to gossip about his odd hairdo. There is even a suspicion that he
wears a toupee. What would happen if Trump heard about the book’s impending publication and wanted to stop it?
The educative defenses might not do the author much good. She has
evoked Trump’s “identity” 275 in an expressive work that entwines fact and
fiction. Because educative defenses rest chiefly on truth telling, they are ill
equipped to challenge publicity claims that target works that intentionally
avoid literal truth. 276 As we saw in Hicks, even the inclusion of some facts
270. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2013).
271. See Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 N.E. 1108, 1110–11 (N.Y. 1913); see also Post,
supra note 89, at 1007 (noting that “[s]ome courts confine the sphere of legitimate public concern
to information that is . . . ‘decontextualized,’ so that they ‘distinguish between fictionalization and
dramatization on the one hand and dissemination of news and information on the other’” (footnotes
omitted)).
272. See Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
273. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968–69 (10th Cir.
1996).
274. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967). Trump certainly hasn’t been shy
about rebuffing insinuations about the size of his nether regions. See Emily Crockett, Donald Trump
Just Defended His Penis Size at the Republican Debate, VOX (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/2016/3/3/11158910/trump-penis-republican-debate-fox (quoting Trump stating, “Look at those hands. Are they small hands? And he referred to my hands—if they’re small,
something else must be small. I guarantee you there’s no problem, I guarantee.”).
275. Even though the book does not use Trump’s name, the Grump character certainly falls
within the “identity” that some courts have recognized is protected by the right of publicity. See,
e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
276. See Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 555
(N.Y. 2000) (explaining that an expressive work “may be so infected with fiction, dramatization or
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might not be enough to make the book newsworthy. 277 And depending on
how far the story strayed from reality, Trump could argue—as the plaintiff
did in Porco—that it constituted a “knowing and substantially fictionalized
account” of his life that merits no protection. 278
This kind of quasi-fictional work might also run afoul of the actual-malice standard that courts like Hoffman and Spahn applied to publicity
claims. 279 The standard first asks whether the work contains a false statement
of fact or creates a “false impression” about the person being portrayed. 280
Fiction stands in contrast to fact. As Chief Justice Bird of the Supreme Court
of California once noted:
[T]he author who denotes his work as fiction proclaims his literary
license and indifference to “the facts.” There is no pretense. All
fiction, by definition, eschews an obligation to be faithful to historical truth. Every fiction writer knows his creation is in some
sense “false.” That is the nature of the art. 281
Once falsity is established, courts ask whether the speaker showed a
“reckless disregard” for the truth, 282 meaning that she told a “known lie” or
“calculated falsehood.” 283 Again, these standards clash with the intentional
use of untruth when creating a fictitious world starring real people. 284 As the
dissenting judge in Spahn cautioned:
embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception”); Sarat
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 296 N.Y.S. 382, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (holding that “an article of current news
or immediate public interest” would be protected but an “article of fiction” would not); Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 456 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 221 N.E. 2d 543 (N.Y. 1966),
vacated sub nom. Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn., 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (holding that an expressive
work that portrays a real person is unprotected when, “by intention, purport, or format, [it] is neither
factual nor historical” and explaining that “if the subject is a living person his written consent must
be obtained”).
277. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
278. See Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y.S.3d 769, 772 (App. Div. 2017).
279. See supra Section II.B.2.
280. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Hoffman
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 875 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 2001); see also Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967).
281. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring);
see also de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 646 (Ct. App. 2018) (“When
the expressive work at issue is fiction, or a combination of fact and fiction, the ‘actual malice’
analysis takes on a further wrinkle. . . . [F]iction is by definition untrue. It is imagined, made-up.
Put more starkly, it is false.”).
282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
283. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
284. There might be further confusion created by applying the actual-malice standard to some
fiction: the requirement that the person being portrayed show by clear and convincing evidence that
the false statement be “of and concerning” him. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., No. ED 78785,
2002 WL 1610972, at *15 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002), rev’d, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (“Even
the plaintiff admits that no one could believe that the actions of the fictional Tony Twist are his
actions. We conclude that a reader could not reasonably believe that the Twist comic book character
is meant to portray, in actual fact, Twist the hockey player, acting as described.”).
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To a fictionalized account of a public figure it is difficult to apply
precisely the criteria of [actual malice]. All fiction is false in the
literal sense that it is imagined rather than actual. It is, of course,
“calculated” because the author knows he is writing fiction and not
fact; and it is more than a “reckless” disregard for truth. Fiction is
the conscious antithesis of truth. 285
The Spahn court’s puzzling demand that expressive works avoid all falsity points to a deeper issue created by applying educative theory in this context: expressive works are often susceptible to many meanings. This complicates matters on two fronts: not only can it be difficult to determine what
“information” a work is conveying to the public, but it is also unclear what
“truth” even means in this context, let alone why it should be required. As
Professor Steven Shiffrin has remarked: “[T]he idea that literature’s claim to
[F]irst [A]mendment protection depends upon its relevance to political life
simply does not ring true. The notion that the classics of literature cannot be
suppressed solely because of their relevance to voter decisionmaking bears
all the earmarks of pure fiction.” 286 This might explain why the Supreme
Court has referenced expressive works to explain why “a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection.” 287 The
Court has rejected the idea that the First Amendment is “confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’” because that would mean protection “would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 288 Indeed, as the Court has explained:
Most of what we say to one another lacks “religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” (let
alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation. Even “[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.” 289
These pronouncements are at odds with an educative theory of free speech:
if the constitutional touchstone is the ability of speech to inform the public,
one might think that a “particularized message” is necessary to help voters
understand what is being said. The Court’s rejection of that standard—and
its embrace of Pollock’s paint splatters—are telling. 290

285. Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 845 (Bergan, J., dissenting).
286. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 48 (1990).
287. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
288. Id.
289. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2010) (alterations in original) (quoting
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971)).
290. Professor Eugene Volokh has critiqued the right of publicity’s incompatibility with the
First Amendment in similar terms:
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Separate from the inherent difficulty of discerning the informational
benefit that an expressive work can provide, educative theory also risks undervaluing expressive works that relate to issues that have not (yet) captured
the public’s attention. This is particularly the case when newsworthiness is
framed as a descriptive standard—when what counts is whether, as an empirical matter, the public generally knows or cares about the subject at issue. 291 Under this descriptive standard, there might be no protection for
works that expose a previously unknown phenomenon, such as a yet-to-bepublicized wave of teenage suicides. 292 Particularly with subversive expressive works, there might be a protection lag between when people are first
confronted with a topic and when it attracts enough awareness to qualify as
something of public concern, yet this moment of limbo might be when protection is needed most.
Finally, the diverse and inconsistent ways in which educative defenses
have been interpreted by the courts in publicity jurisprudence creates confusion for creators of expressive works. The standards differ across jurisdictions; courts waver between broadly and narrowly construing the defenses;
and some courts implement statutory exceptions, while others create ad-hoc
privileges based on particular facts. 293 Many expressive works aspire to have
national reach, but that can be perilous when the protection they receive fluctuates across state lines—especially when a nationwide injunction is among
the possible remedies for successful publicity claims. 294 In all, then, there
are many reasons why educative defenses provide limited protection for expressive works that portray real people.

First Amendment law has also never distinguished “high information content” works
such as books or movies from “low information content” works, a category into which
some might place sculptures, prints, and T-shirts. The First Amendment protects your
right to wear a jacket with a three-word slogan; your right to display a sign containing
just the words “For Peace in the Gulf”; your right to display symbols, such as black armbands or burning flags, that convey a fairly simple (and often not even very precisely
defined) message; and your right to create purely abstract works, such as abstract art,
instrumental music, or absurdist poetry that don’t convey many ideas at all.
Volokh, supra note 32, at 909–10 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26; City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 54–55 (1994); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)); see also Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1304–05 (1976) (arguing that the right of publicity should not apply
to fictional works); James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 660 (1973) (arguing that fictional works should be immune from
liability under the right of publicity because of the First Amendment).
291. POST, supra note 4, at 164; see also BERNARD C. HENNESSY, PUBLIC OPINION 8–9 (3d ed.
1975).
292. See POST, supra note 4, at 168.
293. See supra Section II.B.
294. See Siddique, supra note 23, at 2115–16; Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914,
935 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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III. WHAT’S THE SOLUTION?
Having diagnosed the problems with educative defenses, let us return to
the idea of public discourse to see if a different framework might work better.
This Part begins by exploring how publicity rights interfere with participation
in public discourse. It then considers several approaches that courts and legislatures have used to curb publicity rights and protect speakers’ rights to
create expressive works, concluding that none are responsive to the dynamics
of public discourse. It ends by proposing a new approach and sketching how
courts might use it to address some of the toughest and most topical issues
raised by publicity rights.
A. Why Trump (Probably) Should Not Win
Expressive works deserve more than parasitic protection based on their
ability to convey useful information to voters. They deserve protection because, regardless of their informational impact on listeners, they enable the
formation of public opinion. This feature makes expressive works part of
public discourse and thus should presumptively grant them constitutional
protection, even if they portray real people without permission. Under the
First Amendment, only certain justifications suffice to limit the content of
public discourse. Speakers have wide latitude to choose the form and content
of their speech in public discourse, where they are subject only to narrow
restrictions. In the context of publicity rights, this means that—contrary to
the current state of the doctrine—the mere use of a person’s name or likeness
in public discourse should rarely provide a basis for liability.
Speakers’ rights to create expressive works form an essential part of
participation in public discourse. These works help cultivate the warranted
belief that government is responsive to its citizens, which is essential to the
project of democratic self-government. They also enable processes of mutual
influence through which we shape political and cultural power. As Post has
argued, an important dimension of public discourse is the “wide circulation
of ‘similar social stimuli’” to help make “common experiences available to
those who would otherwise remain unconnected strangers.” 295 This process
occurs through various means, but expressive works are a crucial part of the
“structural skeleton” of public discourse that allows democratic society to
function. 296
On their face, publicity rights could impede the creation of expressive
works and thus restrict our ability to participate in public discourse. This is
especially so when powerful cultural figures assert these rights, as is often
295. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1276
(1995) (quoting JOHN W. BENNET & MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
140 (1952)).
296. Id.
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the case. The right of publicity challenges popular participation in culture by
granting each of us an exclusive right to permit or refuse our portrayal by
others. This exclusive right is worrying on at least two dimensions, both of
which relate to the power that culture has to shape our lives and societies.
The first focuses on individual liberty: by restraining the public’s ability to
portray real people, publicity rights restrict an important form of meaningmaking. 297 As Professor Michael Madow has argued, portrayals of real people serve as “important expressive and communicative resources” 298 that can
enable individual meaning-making. This is particularly true for portrayals of
the socially prominent people more likely to sue to vindicate their publicity
rights, for they often “symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and
cultural values.” 299 To grant a censorship right or veto power to people who
might be portrayed in expressive works is to deprive the public of a valuable
means of self-determination and cultural influence. 300
This point leads to the second problematic dimension of publicity rights’
effect on cultural power: they entrench power with the powerful by facilitating “private censorship of popular culture.” 301 In so doing, they imperil what
Balkin has dubbed a “participatory culture”—one that is “democratic in the
sense that everyone—not just political, economic, or cultural elites—has a
fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in the development
of the ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and subcommunities to which they belong.” 302 By privatizing and centralizing an
297. See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 1, 34; Madow,
supra note 29, at 134.
298. Madow, supra note 29, at 128.
299. Id.
300. For an example of how this affects the creation of expressive works, consider again Spahn
v. Julian Messner, Inc., where Warren Spahn sued over his portrayal in a fictional book directed at
a juvenile audience. The appeals court in that case acknowledged that the author had “urged and,
perhaps, proved, that juvenile biography requires the fillip of dramatization, imagined dialogue,
manipulated chronologies, and fictionalization of events.” Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260
N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 221 N.E. 2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated sub nom. Julian
Messner, Inc. v. Spahn., 387 U.S. 239 (1967). But this proof did not do the author any good; as the
court explained, even assuming this proof, the result was simply that “the publication of juvenile
biographies of living persons, even if public figures, may only be effected with the written consent
of such persons.” Id. The author had argued that public figures would use such a consent-based
system “as a lever for obtaining a price for” consent. Id. But again, the court was unmoved, holding
that “[t]he consent and the price can be avoided by writing strictly factual biographies or by confining unauthorized biographies to those of deceased historic persons.” Id.
301. Madow, supra note 29, at 138.
302. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 132, at 3–4, 33. Balkin’s work
builds on the work of Professor John Fiske, whose idea of “semiotic democracy” illuminates the
importance of popular participation in culture. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236, 239 (1987).
Balkin is not the first to channel Fiske’s work—a host of scholars have advocated that intellectualproperty law should promote popular access and participation in cultural discourse. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
9–10 (2001); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe,
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important form of cultural power, the right of publicity exacerbates the trend
of top-down management of popular culture by powerful figures in the culture industries, at the expense of marginalized and subordinated groups.
Trump’s claims against Gore and Miller strike at the heart of why the
First Amendment should protect participation in public discourse. Both the
song and the painting serve as mediums for the communication of ideas and
opinions. That alone entitles them to a strong presumption of protection. But
before we can be sure that Trump’s claims should fail, we need to analyze
whether any of the interests served by publicity rights are of the kind that
may restrict public discourse.
B. Protecting Public Discourse
In order to decide on the right framework, it is essential to scrutinize
both the interests that publicity rights purport to serve and the values furthered by the First Amendment. As we will see, some frameworks proposed
by courts and scholars leave room for consideration of certain interests but
not others. Though public discourse enjoys a strong presumption of protection against restriction, there are times when protection of particular interests
is permissible within public discourse.303
Publicity rights have been said to serve both public and individual interests. The main public interest advanced to justify publicity rights is that they
create incentives for people to act in ways that ultimately advance public
welfare. This incentives rationale draws on analogies to protection for copyright and patents and relies on the premise that people will be more likely
to invest the time and energy to develop their talents if they are financially
rewarded in the form of an economic legal right. 304 The corollary individual
interest is the labor-reward rationale, which seeks to justify publicity rights
on the ground that they reward labor and prevent unjust enrichment caused
by freeloading. 305
Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass
Culture, Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 272–73 (1996); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998);
Kenneth Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 27 (2000);
David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in
the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); David Lange, Reimagining
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 475–83 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–65 & n.310 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy
and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).
303. See Post, supra note 35, at 1009.
304. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
305. See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10 (summarizing arguments made by others).
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Although these rationales have some intuitive appeal, they must be construed narrowly to avoid absurd results. All sorts of unauthorized uses that
should enjoy First Amendment protection will remove some incentives for
people to act in ways that might ultimately benefit the public. Take the example of Mark Zuckerberg’s portrayal in the Social Network, a movie produced by Aaron Sorkin that tells the story of Facebook’s early years. 306 The
movie’s creation removes some incentives for Zuckerberg to make a similar
expressive work that tells the story from his perspective, but that alone cannot
be sufficient to grant him a veto power simply because he was portrayed in
Sorkin’s rendition. Yet that is precisely what the right of publicity could
allow if these rationales are loosely applied within public discourse.
The Supreme Court’s only experience with the right of publicity provides guidance for how to construe these rationales narrowly to avoid First
Amendment concerns. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 307
Mr. Zacchini, a “human cannonball” performer, did his stunt at a local fair.308
After a news station filmed and televised his entire act, he claimed his right
of publicity had been violated. 309 The state supreme court blocked the claim
and granted the news station First Amendment protection for its broadcast,
but the Court reversed. Although plaintiffs may wish to construe Zacchini
broadly as protecting a robust right of publicity even in the context of public
discourse, a careful reading of the decision suggests otherwise. The Court
emphasized that Zacchini’s “performance” and the news clip both lasted fifteen seconds, meaning that the broadcast showed his “entire performance.”310
This emphasis could support a pair of related restrictions that limit the laborreward and incentives rationales to performances that are reproduced in their
entirety. 311 We might combine these restrictions into the single rule that publicity rights may restrict public discourse when the unauthorized use of someone’s likeness is substitutive. 312
To understand what this might mean in the context of expressive works,
we can learn a lot from Zacchini itself. On multiple occasions, the Court
drew a distinction between reproduction of Zacchini’s performance and other
uses of a person’s name or likeness. For instance, the Court explicitly noted
that Zacchini’s case was “more limited” than other publicity claims that
“merely assert . . . some general use” of a person’s name or likeness. 313 The
306. THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Relativity Media 2010).
307. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
308. Id. at 563.
309. Id. at 563–64.
310. Id. at 564.
311. The Court’s short opinion refers to Zacchini’s “performance” sixteen times above the line,
and the word “entire” modifies it (or a synonym for it) twelve of those times. See id. at 563–79.
312. Cf. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing the
idea of “substitutive competition” and “substitutive value” in copyright law).
313. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 n.10.
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Court then described Zacchini’s claim as “much narrower” because it concerned “an entire act that he ordinarily gets paid to perform.” 314 This strongly
suggests that the First Amendment provides less protection to rebroadcast a
performance than other cases of unauthorized use of a person’s name or likeness. It would be a “very different case,” the Court explained, if the news
station “had merely reported” and “described” Zacchini’s performance, even
if it had also shown his picture. 315 In dicta, the Court confidently asserted
that it was “evident” that the right of publicity would not prevent someone
from “reporting” facts about Zacchini’s act. 316 Professor Eugene Volokh has
made a similar point, noting that the Court “twice stressed that it was not
deciding the broader question of when a plaintiff may sue the defendant for
using plaintiff’s name, likeness, or other attributes of identity.” 317 Indeed, as
Patrick Kabat has quipped, the Court’s repeated emphasis on the fact that
Zacchini’s claim was about “performance, not likeness” suggests that the decision “would have been the same if he had launched a pig, rather than himself, from the canon.” 318
The Court also implied that it was significant that the news clip showed
Zacchini’s “entire performance,” and not merely a snippet of it.319 Because
viewing the act on the evening news served as a substitute for viewing it in
person—and paying for the privilege—Zacchini’s claim presented different
First Amendment stakes. Although the Court’s dicta did not elaborate on
precisely how the outcome would differ, the opinion strongly suggests that
only a narrow publicity claim could survive constitutional scrutiny in the context of public discourse. The Court not only framed the interest served by
the right of publicity as a “proprietary interest of the individual in his act,”
but it also spoke in general terms when declaring that, in publicity cases, “the
only question is who gets to do the publishing.” 320 Zacchini, the Court
stressed, sought no injunction and requested only compensation for the
broadcasting of his entire act. 321 This suggests that only cases involving substitutive uses of a likeness—that is, cases where more than one actor could

314. Id.; see also id. at 574 (distinguishing between using someone’s name or likeness in “the
reporting of events” from “an attempt to broadcast or publish an entire act for which the performer
ordinarily gets paid”).
315. Id. at 569.
316. Id. at 574; see also id. at 576 (“[T]he broadcast of petitioner’s entire performance, unlike
the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or
picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”).
317. Volokh, supra note 32, at 906.
318. PATRICK KABAT, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: THROUGH THE THICKET? 11 (2015),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/deans-office/files/Kernochan/14.pdf.
319. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77 (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
321. Id. at 573–74.
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“do the publishing”—fall within the scope of permissible limitations of public discourse under Zacchini. 322
This particular limitation can be squared with the premises of public
discourse for two reasons. 323 First, by insisting that Zacchini’s requested relief was in no way censorial, the Court indicated that his claim would not
actually prevent the news station from broadcasting his performance. The
Court felt it was “important to note” that the news station would not “be deprived of the benefit” of rebroadcasting Zacchini’s performance “as long as
his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.” 324 This framing
honors the speaker’s right to reproduce a performance, albeit at a price. 325
Although we might usually worry about having to pay for the privilege of
participating in public discourse, the Court concluded that the right to compensation—but not the right to censor—was a fair constitutional compromise
when the speech in question was a substitutive reproduction of an “entire
performance.” 326
The second reason that Zacchini’s narrow rule is consistent with the
premises of public discourse is that its logic is grounded in protecting and
encouraging other constitutionally protected expression. The Court highlighted that narrow claims concerning a performance like Zacchini’s “encourage such entertainment” 327 and provide the “economic incentive” necessary for performers “to make the investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public.” 328 The Court appeared comfortable
with Zacchini’s claim only because broadcasting his “entire act pose[d] a
substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.” 329 Although
the Court was a little vague on what constituted a “substantial threat” in this
context, it did explain that “[t]he effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing [Zacchini] from charging an admission fee”
and “goes to the heart of [his] ability to earn a living as an entertainer.” 330 In
322. Id.
323. I have some doubts about the Court’s wisdom in concluding that viewing Zacchini’s performance on the nightly news is substitutive for seeing it in person. It seems to me that there are
many reasons why seeing it live—when the suspense created by this daredevil stunt would surely
be higher—would be a quite different experience. But Zacchini is binding law, at least for now.
324. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
325. See id. (emphasizing that Zacchini “d[id] not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply want[ed] to be paid for it”).
326. Id. at 576.
327. Id. at 573.
328. Id. at 576. In one significant passage, the Court analogized claims like Zacchini’s to claims
under copyright law. The Court explained that copyright protections are intended “to afford greater
encouragement to the production of works of benefit to the public,” and the First Amendment “does
not prevent [states] from making a similar choice . . . to protect the entertainer’s incentive in order
to encourage the production of this type of work.” Id. at 577 (quoting Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
329. Id. at 575.
330. Id. at 575–76.
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other words, the Court concluded that televising the performance without
compensating Zacchini was equivalent to depriving him of the entire economic value of his live performance.
This presents a high bar for plaintiffs to meet. In order to restrict public
discourse, a plaintiff would have to show that the unauthorized broadcast of
a performance would pose a substantial threat to the performer’s ability to do
his performance. The Court demanded more than an abstract threat, insisting
that Zacchini prove on remand that the broadcast actually caused him to suffer an economic loss. If, for example, the “broadcast increased the value of
[Zacchini’s] performance by stimulating the public’s interest in seeing the act
live,” the Court concluded that Zacchini “would not be able to prove damages
and thus would not recover.” 331 Zacchini had alleged that the broadcast
caused him $25,000 in damages, and the Court conditionally approved “compensation of this injury if proved.” 332
Read as a whole, Zacchini circumscribes the role that the labor-reward
and incentives rationales can play in justifying publicity claims that would
interfere with public discourse. When a use of someone’s name or likeness
is substitutive, it seems fair to presume that an uncompensated replication
will both remove incentives and create injustice when the one who worked
to create the value is left penniless and someone else gets paid. Under these
narrow circumstances, allowing compensation upon proof of economic loss
can be compatible with robust protection of public discourse. But the same
cannot be said for non-substitutive uses. Even assuming a person has a moral
claim to reap some rewards from her labor, that claim cannot justify hoarding
all of the rewards that publicity rights would give them. Other actors contributed labor that created the identity’s value, including consumers and the
media. 333 In sum, publicity claims premised on the labor-reward and incentives rationales cannot survive constitutional challenges unless the unauthorized portrayal is substitutive and both actually and substantially threatens a
performer’s ability to perform. 334
331. Id. at 575 n.12.
332. Id. (emphasis added).
333. See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 105–10; Madow, supra note 29, at 182–84 .
334. Narrowing the incentives rationale in this way is also responsive to two common critiques
of a broad construction of the rationale. First, scholars have attacked the incentives rationale on the
basis that plenty of adequate incentives already exist to achieve fame, such that publicity rights offer
no meaningful enhancement. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 101–02. Second, scholars have
observed that, to the extent that the incentive rationale ultimately rests on enriching public welfare,
we must also factor in the considerable costs to the public brought about by speech restrictions
imposed by publicity rights. See, e.g., id.
Law-and-economics scholars have advanced a similar public interest based on the idea that
publicity rights efficiently maximize wealth and allocate resources in ways that ultimately benefit
the public. See supra note 41. This efficiency rationale depends on an assumption that unauthorized
portrayals in expressive works will decrease the commercial value of a person’s name or likeness—
an assumption that the Court rejected in Zacchini. Like a broadly construed incentives rationale,
the efficiency rationale falls apart on closer inspection. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 32, at 911
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Other scholars have argued that publicity rights can serve individual interests by redressing dignitary injuries to a person’s autonomy, liberty, and
privacy. 335 Depending on the context, the dignity rationale can also be understood to vindicate public interests, such as when publicity rights provide
a remedy for false product endorsements that deceive consumers and simultaneously inflict dignitary injuries on the person falsely associated with the
product. 336 To understand how this rationale interacts with public discourse,
we must be specific about how any particular unauthorized use harms dignity
and develop some normative conception of what dignitary harms are cognizable in this context. There are all kinds of expressive uses of a person’s
name or likeness that could be said to harm dignity—perhaps a person simply
does not like the actress picked to play them, or they do not like how an artist
drew their nose or hair—and it would severely curtail public discourse if all
of these uses triggered liability. 337
The Supreme Court has repeatedly blocked claims that seek to redressed
dignitary harms caused by public discourse. 338 As Justice O’Connor wrote
in Boos v. Barry, 339 the Court’s constitutional doctrine furnishes the rule “that
in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide ‘adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’” 340 This rule, as Post has observed,
“essentially immunizes public discourse from the legal imposition of community norms of decency and respect,” 341 but it is subject to “the paradox of

n.32. Many of the empirical claims that underlie it are simply unknowable. For example, unauthorized portrayals do sometimes enhance the value of someone’s identity, but it’s impossible to
know in advance which portrayals do or don’t or to objectively measure “the value of someone’s
identity.” We also should not presume (as the efficiency rationale does) that any person deserves
the entire value of her identity, nor can we know (and indeed we might doubt) that vesting a right
of portrayal in one person instead of the public actually enhances the overall public welfare. See
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 100–05.
335. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 111–12; Kwall, supra note 44, at 158–59.
336. McKenna, supra note 45, at 225; Lemley, supra note 10, at 1163–64.
337. See Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 134 (Cal. 2009); Lemley, supra note 10,
at 1163 (“The private citizen who finds himself on the side of a coffee can as the face of instant
coffee, for instance, may have lost control over his destiny in some meaningful way that the law
probably should care about.”). But see Lemley, supra note 10, at 1165 (worrying that the same
dignity rationale might preclude portrayals of the neo-Nazis in Charlottesville or the police who
have murdered black Americans).
338. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
339. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
340. Id. at 322 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at
56).
341. Post, supra note 295, at 1276; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 51; Cohen v.
California 403 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1971); Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The
Legal Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 173–74 (John
W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds. 1993).
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public discourse”—a term Post has coined to capture the idea that public discourse can perform its constitutional function “only if it is conducted with a
modicum of civility.” 342 Although enforcing civility rules may constrain free
speech, people are unlikely to experience public discourse as a medium
through which they may influence the construction of public opinion if it becomes sufficiently abusive and alienating. 343 Under sufficiently uncivil conditions, public discourse will no longer foster the sense of legitimacy and
participation, and thus the justification for protecting it will diminish. 344
The paradox of public discourse gives us guidance on the limits that the
First Amendment should place on publicity claims that seek to remedy dignitary harms. The Court has made clear that state torts like the right of publicity “can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and
“must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” 345 Current constitutional doctrine means that many dignitary harms caused by
speech in public discourse are not cognizable. This doctrine does not deny
that speech in public discourse can cause severe harms to dignity; rather, it
reflects the judgment that the First Amendment must protect forms of speech
despite the harm that they cause. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court
in Snyder v. Phelps 346:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears
of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On
the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the
speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not
stifle public debate. 347
Nevertheless, the Court has allowed certain types of dignitary harms to
be redressed by state torts despite the fact that the harms stemmed from
speech in public discourse. Defamation and false light provide two examples. Faced with claims that false or misleading speech in public discourse
caused someone harm, the Court has crafted constitutional rules that recognize robust First Amendment rights while still allowing people to obtain a
remedy if they make certain evidentiary showings. 348
This solicitude for only certain types of dignitary claims reflects a deep
tension within constitutional doctrine. Post’s “paradox” captures the troubling notion that the First Amendment “suspends legal enforcement of the

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Post, supra note 35, at 1009.
Id.
Id.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
562 U.S. 443 (2011).
Id. at 460–61.
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269.
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very civility rules that make rational deliberation possible.”349 This tension,
according to Professor Lawrence Lessig, “cannot be avoided,” for “public
discourse must ‘blunt’ rules of civility if it is to assure a critical space within
which reflection about community life can occur,” and “[y]et if it blunts these
rules of civility too much, it will undercut the very community that it criticizes.” 350 This has led Post and others to conclude that public discourse can
perform its constitutional function only if people conduct it with a “modicum” of civility. 351 Quite what this “modicum” covers is contestable, but
“legal regulation to enforce community standards of civility may be required
as an unfortunate but necessary option of last resort” if the breakdown of civil
discourse is sufficiently extreme. 352 In these circumstances, publicity claims
seeking to redress dignitary harms might still be compatible with protection
of public discourse.
C. Hard Cases
If publicity doctrine were reframed in the way I have suggested, how
might courts handle the thorniest publicity-related issues of the day? It is
difficult to map out hypotheticals precisely, but this Section considers how
several new technologies might pose novel challenges to the doctrine. It first
considers four speaker-focused approaches that courts and legislatures have
used to curb publicity rights due to concerns about free speech. All of these
approaches would serve speakers’ interests better than the listener-focused
defenses that currently rule the roost, but none are satisfactory because they
either over-protect or under-protect speech interests. This Section then concludes by sketching out preliminary thoughts about how courts should approach some of the pressing disputes that are, or soon will be, before them.
In recent years, innovation surrounding the simulation of human likeness has advanced at a rapid speed. 353 So too has our ability to post and
spread videos and images online. These new technologies enable the widespread creation and dissemination of “audio and video of real people saying
and doing things they never said or did.” 354 These so-called “deep fakes”

349. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 267, 287 (1991).
350. Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (1996).
351. Post, supra note 35, at 1009.
352. Post, supra note 349, at 287 (giving the example of “fighting words” as the “paradigmatic
example” of this extreme condition).
353. Professors Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron have written a path-breaking article on this
topic, shedding light on how “deep fake” technology can lead to an array of harms to individuals
and society. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3213954##.
354. Id. (manuscript at 1).
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have featured near-perfect simulations of various celebrities’ faces transposed onto the bodies of actresses in pornographic movies, among other
things. 355 The technology is so widely available, there is no reason why these
uses will be limited to celebrities; any stilted ex-lover could retaliate against
a former partner by creating and spreading such a video on the internet. To
make matters worse, advances in the field of virtual reality have the potential
to transform deep fakes into a fully immersive experience. 356 In a related
vein, the proliferation of “nonconsensual pornography” or “revenge porn”—
terms used to describe the “distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent”—is a problem of growing concern, particularly for women who are the overwhelming targets of such abhorrent behavior. 357 A distinct set of challenges has arisen in response to developments in
the world of sports and entertainment. Hyper-realistic videogames have featured real-world celebrities, 358 and the market has exploded for fantasy sports
that allow the public to play online competitions between made-up teams
filled with actual sports stars. 359 Meanwhile, expressive works have increasingly portrayed famous figures in fictional settings 360 and featured deceased
actors who have been “reanimated” to reprise their roles after death. 361
Lastly, the faces of cultural icons have appeared on dolls, busts, and other
commemorative merchandise. 362

355. Id.
356. These “virtual” recreations need not be technologically sophisticated. One could imagine
a market for sex dolls that look like real people. Cf. Jenna Moon & Claire Floody, North America’s
First Known Sex Doll Brothel Opening in Toronto, THE STAR (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/08/26/north-americas-first-known-sex-doll-brothel-opening-in-toronto.html (describing North America’s first “sex doll brothel” where clients can seek sexual pleasure “without the many restrictions and limitations that a real partner may come with”).
357. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). These images can be obtained by the revenge pornographer both
non-consensually, as when taken through hidden cameras or videos of sexual assault; or consensually, as when given by an intimate partner. But in both scenarios, the publication and distribution
are non-consensual, and are often done not just for voyeuristic or economic motivation but also with
mal-intent for the depicted. See id. We owe a great debt to Professors Danielle Citron and Mary
Anne Franks for their tireless and inspirational work on how the law might address the atrocity of
nonconsensual pornography.
358. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2013); No Doubt v. Activision
Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011); Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC
551747, 2014 WL 5930149 at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014).
359. See Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2018).
360. See, e.g., Tonya Riley, The Dubious Ethics of “Real-Person Fiction,” DARK(ISH) WEB
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://medium.com/s/darkish-web/the-dubious-ethics-of-real-person-fiction5cd6bd498c16.
361. See, e.g., Catherine Shoard, Peter Cushing Is Dead. Rogue One’s Resurrection Is a Digital
(Dec.
21,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisIndignity,
GUARDIAN
free/2016/dec/21/peter-cushing-rogue-one-resurrection-cgi.
362. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.
296 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982).
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All of these portrayals of real people raise complicated questions under
publicity doctrine. They all arguably occur in expressive works and thus
should trigger some form of constitutional scrutiny to protect speakers’ rights
to participate in public discourse. One approach would be to immunize all
these works under a blanket rule that publicity rights can never inhibit portrayals of real people in expressive works. Under this approach, the right of
publicity would remain a viable claim to challenge unauthorized portrayals
in commercial speech, but all portrayals in public discourse would be fully
protected. Some states already guarantee statutory protection to this effect
by providing an exemption to the right of publicity if the portrayal of a real
person is part of an expressive work. 363 Courts in other states have offered
similar carve-outs through statutory construction of publicity tort elements. 364 This sweeping approach has the advantage of leaving less uncertainty for creators of expressive works whose speech might otherwise be
chilled, but it has the disadvantage of leaving no room for consideration of
competing interests advanced by the right of publicity. This inflexibility is
troubling when new technologies threaten novel harms that publicity rights
might vindicate. Consider the example of nonconsensual pornography.
These films and photographs might often qualify as expressive works that are
part of public discourse, 365 meaning that they would be immune from publicity claims under this regime. Although categorical protection would be a
boon to creators of expressive works, it might ultimately undermine the
premises of public discourse if it shields uses of a person’s likeness that are
substitutive or inflict severe dignitary harms.
A second approach would be to allow publicity rights to prevail against
expressive works only if they are likely to deceive the public in some legally
cognizable way. Some courts have adopted the standard from Rogers v. Grimaldi, 366 which permits publicity claims to prevail only if the expressive
work is actually a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods
or services. 367 This approach, which has roots in trademark law, essentially
serves to double check if commercial speech is masquerading as an expressive work to gain constitutional protection. Courts first ask if the portrayal
is part of an expressive work; if it is, the court then considers whether the
363. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-761(H)(1) (2017).
364. See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2005) (holding
that Florida’s statutory right of publicity doesn’t apply to expressive works because the statute’s use
of “the term ‘commercial purpose’ . . . does not apply to publications, including motion pictures,
which do not directly promote a product or service”).
365. I see many troubles with this conclusion, but it seems difficult to escape it given the constitutional treatment of film and photography as presumptively protected media for the communication of ideas. See Post, supra note 295, at 1253. An important caveat might be that nonconsensual
pornography that is also obtained non-consensually would not be part of public discourse even if
the person who took the video or photograph shared it publicly. See supra note 357.
366. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
367. Id. at 1004–05.
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portrayal is “wholly unrelated” to the expressive work (that is, if it has “no
artistic relevance” whatsoever to the underlying work) and whether the expressive work is merely a “disguised commercial advertisement” that explicitly deceives the public by affirmatively claiming sponsorship or endorsement. 368 The main advantage of the Rogers test is that it would offer robust
protection for public discourse. In practice, it has proven to be a speechprotective standard because it effectively recognizes only one of the interests
purportedly served by the right of publicity—likelihood of consumer confusion that the plaintiff has endorsed a product or service. But that feature is
also its bug. To its detriment, the Rogers test is inflexible in recognizing
other interests that publicity rights might serve, especially those triggered by
new technologies that inflict harms that have nothing to do with consumer
confusion. Take the example of the dignitary harms caused by expressive
works like deep fakes that feature real people’s faces transposed onto videos
and photos, many of which are pornographic. The harm wrought by these
expressive works is not simply that a viewer might be deceived into believing
that they are watching a video that actually portrays the subject (although,
that harm may also exist). Rather, it is the dignitary harm inflicted on the
subject herself. If, for example, the deep fake featured a disclaimer that informed the viewer that the famous actress being depicted had not actually
been filmed performing a sexual act, the deception-based claim would fail
but a harm to her dignity would remain. The Rogers test, however, would
offer no relief.
Perhaps the most commonly used—and yet most commonly criticized—way to reconcile the First Amendment with publicity rights is the
transformative-use test. 369 This test offers protection for expressive works
that sufficiently “transform[]” a person’s name or likeness. 370 In Winter v.
DC Comics, 371 for example, the California Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protected a comic book featuring two “villainous half-worm,
half-human offspring” named Johnny and Edgar Autumn (based on the sibling rock duo Johnny and Edgar Winter). 372 Similarly, in Kirby v. Sega of
America, Inc., 373 the California Court of Appeals blocked a publicity claim
brought against the creators of a videogame starring an avatar based on singer
Kierin Kirby because the avatar was “fanciful” and appeared “in outer space

368. See id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6
(Cal. 1979) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring)); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547
F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
369. See generally Kadri, supra note 27 (critiquing the test).
370. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)
(asking whether the expressive work added significant creative elements “so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation”).
371. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
372. Id. at 476.
373. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006).
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in the 25th Century.” 374 This might sound promising for creators of expressive works, but these speech-protective decisions are outliers under the transformative-use test, which has more often resulted in expressive works being
penalized—especially when the works feature realistic depictions, unlike
those in Winter and Kirby. 375 In a pair of cases brought by college athletes
against the makers of a videogame, two courts concluded that the works were
not sufficiently “transformative” because the avatars were so realistic, the
statistics in the game were historically accurate, and the athletes were associated with their actual colleges in their actual stadiums. 376 The First Amendment offered no protection because the videogame “literally recreates” each
player “in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.” 377 The transformative-use test is beset by flaws, many of which I have addressed elsewhere, 378 but the chief concern for our purposes is that forcing creators of
expressive works to refrain from using realism is incompatible with the right
to participate in public discourse. Many expressive works that depend on
realistic portrayals—docudramas, biopics, biographies, documentaries, and
portraits—would be vulnerable if the constitutional barometer required transformation to diverge from reality. The First Amendment should not be interpreted in such a manner if it is to foster cultural participation through public
discourse.
Finally, courts might apply strict scrutiny to publicity claims that challenge portrayals of real people in expressive works. At least one prominent
court has done so in assessing whether such a publicity claim was consistent
with the First Amendment. In Sarver v. Chartier, 379 the Ninth Circuit explained that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based on its
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.” 380 Applying that standard to a publicity claim
brought against the makers of a movie based on a true story, the court noted
that California’s right of publicity “clearly restricts speech based upon its
content” and held that the plaintiff showed no compelling interest in preventing his portrayal in the expressive work. 381 Strict scrutiny has the advantage
374. Id. at 609–10, 618.
375. See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); No
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011).
376. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276–79; Hart, 717 F.3d at 166, 169.
377. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“The digital Ryan Hart does what
the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football . . . . This is not transformative.”).
378. See Kadri, supra note 27.
379. 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016).
380. Id. at 903 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)).
381. Id. at 903–06. The Sarver court appeared to assume that the only interest that publicity
rights could serve is to prevent a portrayal that “appropriates the economic value of a performance
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of allowing courts to inspect on a case-by-case basis the particular interests
that publicity rights might serve and to demand that the publicity-based remedy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.382 This flexibility is advantageous as courts are called to respond to emerging technologies that create
novel harms. But there are two serious disadvantages to this approach. First,
it retains much of the uncertainty that currently plagues this area of the law
because it is tough to predict in advance which interests courts will find compelling and narrowly addressed in any given case. Second, and relatedly, the
standard itself does not inherently curtail the long list of interests that publicity rights purportedly serve and yet fail to withstand serious scrutiny. As a
result, there is no guarantee that the interests that a court will find compelling
are responsive to the premises of public discourse.
Returning to our earlier discussion, I have argued that there are only two
interests served by publicity rights that can be compatible with adequate protection for public discourse. The first—a modified incentives rationale—
protects the interest in being compensated for substitutive portrayals that actually and substantially threaten a person’s ability to engage in other forms
of expression. 383 The second—a modified dignitary rationale—recognizes
the interest in redressing portrayals that inflict extreme dignitary harms that
are sufficiently abusive and alienating to warrant legal intervention. 384 These
are, to be sure, nuanced and delicate concepts for courts to apply, and they
will not provide creators of expressive works with perfect ex-ante notice as
to their potential liability. But that is sometimes the nature of constitutional
analysis, particularly when strong competing interests clash. The First
Amendment protects robust rights to participate in public discourse, but the
state can also furnish individuals with rights under tort law that serve narrow
interests compatible with protection for public discourse. As we have seen,
publicity rights have often been interpreted broadly and in ways that curtail
speakers’ abilities to portray real people in expressive works, but it would be
unwise to swing too far in the opposite direction and conclude that the right
of publicity is unequivocally unconstitutional within this realm. For one
thing, Zacchini teaches us that certain publicity claims are compatible with
the First Amendment’s protection of public discourse—the defendant that

or persona or seeks to capitalize off a celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements.” Id. at 905.
Because the plaintiff hadn’t made “the investment required to produce a performance of interest to
the public,” he couldn’t establish a compelling interest. Id. (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)).
382. See Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2808559, at *11–*19
(D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to block publicity claims brought against an activist who sold anti-war t-shirts featuring the names of 3461 deceased soldiers alongside the slogan
“Bush Lied—They Died”).
383. See supra Section III.B.
384. See id.
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was found liable in that case was, after all, a news organization that was reporting current events to the public. 385 For another, although legal recourse
for violations of civility norms is rarely permissible within public discourse,
there are some dignitary harms caused by uncivil speech that have withstood
constitutional scrutiny. 386
Appreciating these two interests can help courts address some of today’s
most challenging legal questions raised by portrayals of real people. It is
impossible to resolve all of these questions in the abstract, but it is nonetheless useful to make some general observations about how publicity rights
might interact with the First Amendment in some of the harder cases foreshadowed above: deep fakes, nonconsensual pornography, virtual reality,
videogames, fantasy sports, fictional works, digital reanimation, and commemorative merchandise. It seems unlikely that the modified incentives rationale will justify many publicity claims raised by these uses of someone’s
name or likeness because they are not substitutive. In a deep fake or revenge
porn video, for example, a woman suing because her nonconsensual appearance in a pornographic film causes her emotional distress is not seeking compensation because the video threatens her ability to profit from a similar expressive work. 387 Similarly, when a person’s name or likeness is used in
videogames, fantasy sports, or fictional works, it is farfetched to say that the
use serves as a substitute for other expression by that person. The creators of
the Grand Theft Auto videogame, for example, did not threaten Lindsay Lohan’s acting career by including an avatar that arguably invoked her image. 388
The incentives rationale might someday be important if digital reanimation
becomes a substitute for real actors and musicians. A performer recreated
into a life-like and look-alike avatar might be able to make a showing that the
portrayal is substitutive, but it would still appear to be a high hurdle to clear
given Zacchini’s insistence that plaintiffs relying on this rationale show actual damages caused by the portrayal. 389
The modified dignitary rationale might be more responsive to some of
the harms created by new technologies. Nonconsensual pornography—
whether created artificially as in deep fakes or shared without permission as
in revenge porn—might represent such an extreme violation of civility norms
that legal recourse would still be consistent with the First Amendment. It is,
admittedly, difficult to cabin the scope of these dignitary interests, but many
of these unauthorized portrayals create abusive and alienating conditions that

385. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
386. See supra notes 338–352 and accompanying text.
387. An interesting exception to this general point might be pornographic actors portrayed in
deep fakes in a way that was substitutive for their own work.
388. See Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389, 392 (N.Y. 2018).
389. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575 n.12.
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threaten the premises of protection for public discourse. 390 Many, however,
will not—and it is important to consider them when drawing constitutional
lines. We have already seen many ways that deep fakes can create laudable,
pro-social speech that should be shielded by the First Amendment. Consider,
for example, the enhancements this technology could bring in the realm of
education. In teaching about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
a deep fake could allow us to hear the speech he was due to give on the day
of his death in his own voice, as one Scotland-based company has now
done. 391 Similarly, imagine the powerful artistic uses of deep fakes, similar
to the digital manipulation in Forrest Gump where doctored video footage
portrayed three past presidents meeting with the movie’s protagonist and saying things they never said. 392 Deep fakes can also spur valuable political
speech, as when a Belgian political party created a deep fake depicting President Trump giving a fictional address where he says: “As you know I had
the balls to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. And so should
you.” 393 Although Trump never used those words in abandoning the agreement, the political party used this tool to “start a public debate” to “draw
attention to the necessity to act on climate change.” 394 All of these deep fakes
deserve First Amendment protection as quintessential forms of public discourse. 395
390. See Post, supra note 35, at 1009; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE
L.J. 1870, 1921–24 (2019) (discussing an array of repugnant deep fakes and raising the awful specter of a deep fake featuring someone being raped). Citron argued that the right of publicity “is
inapplicable” in this context “because creators of deep-fake sex videos likely do not use people’s
faces or bodies for a commercial advantage.” Id. at 1939 n.461; see also Chesney & Citron, supra
note 353 (manuscript at 16) (arguing that the right of publicity would be impotent against most deep
fakes because, “[f]or better or worse, the commercial-gain element sharply limits the utility of this
model: the harms associated with deep fakes do not typically generate direct financial gain for their
creators”). Although it is true that some courts have used concepts related to commerciality to cabin
the reach of publicity rights, courts in many jurisdictions would likely include deep fakes within the
tort’s potential scope so long as the portrayal gave the defendant some sort of advantage. See Rothman, supra note 23, at 1950 (noting that, in some states, “any purpose or advantage” will suffice).
To the extent that a state seeks to limit publicity liability to “commercial” uses, I agree with Citron
(and Chesney) that some nonconsensual pornography might evade liability. In my view, that would
be a compelling reason to reform that state’s law to remove a commerciality requirement. See
Citron, supra, at 1951 (arguing that “[t]he privacy torts should evolve” to provide “robust protection
of the ability to determine for oneself how much of one’s naked body, intimate information, or
intimate activities are exposed to others”).
391. John F Kennedy’s Lost ‘Last’ Speech Recreated, BBC (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-scotland-43436361/john-f-kennedy-s-lost-last-speech-recreated.
392. See FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994) (referring to the “I Gotta Pee,” “Shot in
the Buttocks,” and “Watergate Hotel” scenes featuring Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B.
Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon).
393. Hans von der Burchard, Belgian Socialist Party Circulates ‘Deep Fake’ Donald Trump
Video, POLITICO (May 21, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/spa-donald-trump-belgium-parisclimate-agreement-belgian-socialist-party-circulates-deep-fake-trump-video/.
394. Id. (quoting the Flemish Socialist Party).
395. There may be other beneficial uses of deep fakes that do not fit neatly within the constitutional concept of public discourse. For example, deep fakes can enhance autonomy and equality for
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Looking beyond deep fakes, the claims brought so far against creators
of fantasy-sports games, videogames, and merchandise would struggle to
meet the exacting standard under the modified dignitary rationale. In my
view, these unauthorized portrayals do not offend civility norms in the way
that nonconsensual depiction and dissemination of sexual acts does. The
plaintiffs might wish to share in the profits generated by these media of expression, but their portrayals do not create the type of abusive and alienating
conditions that undermine public discourse. 396 Of course, these media could
theoretically be used to inflict serious dignitary harms, and courts must be
prepared to adapt to changing conditions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come to curb the right of publicity and reframe the First
Amendment justifications that face off against it. When plaintiffs successfully use the right of publicity against expressive works, the tort censors—or
at least ransoms—the portrayal of real people and threatens public discourse.
Protection for expressive works that portray real people should not depend
on their providing information to citizens in voting booths or politicians in
legislative chambers. Instead, this form of expression should presumptively
be protected as a valuable part of the public’s participation in the “building
of the whole culture.” 397 By recalibrating the theoretical foundations of this
debate, we can justify and explain speech protection for these works with
greater confidence and coherence.
This Article has illustrated a simple but important point: the theories we
use to justify rights matter. This realization is particularly crucial in First
Amendment doctrine, which often operates categorically—a theory about
what speech is protected is also a theory about what speech is unprotected.
Educative theory has played an important role in protecting speech for many
years, and it will surely continue to do so in certain cases. But its limits are

people with disabilities who might use the technology to virtually engage with life experiences that
would be impossible in a conventional sense. Allie Volpe, Deepfake Porn Has Terrifying Implications. But What if It Could Be Used for Good?, MEN’S HEALTH (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.menshealth.com/sex-women/a19755663/deepfakes-porn-reddit-pornhub (giving the example of people
suffering from physical disabilities interposing their faces along with those of their consenting partners into pornographic videos); see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 353 (manuscript at 16).
These private uses raise slightly different constitutional considerations than those discussed in this
Article, but they might nonetheless deserve protection under the First Amendment.
396. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, might have wanted a piece of the pie when a
fundraising campaign amassed over $600,000 to create “action figures” in her image. See Sarah
Berger, Over $600,000 Has Been Raised on Kickstarter for a Ruth Bader Ginsburg Action Figure,
CNBC (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/06/fctry-kickstarter-raises-money-for-ruthbader-ginsburg-action-figure-.html. The “Notorious RBG” never attempted to sue, but, even if she
did bring a publicity claim, I do not believe the modified dignitary rationale would justify liability
in this case.
397. EMERSON, supra note 134, at 7.
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apparent when it is raised as a shield for expressive works that portray real
people. This is because free speech is not merely about the “sweat and agony
of the mind” of the meticulous voter, 398 but also the role that expression plays
in legitimating democratic power and influencing cultural power. Through
the idea of public discourse, we can better understand the values that should
animate the doctrine—and, in so doing, be prepared to face the vexing questions that new technologies will surely compel us to answer.

398. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 10.

